Movement of Budo (martial arts) and Luhmann's systems theory

1 Introduction


I participated in the 3 day seminar (April 20-22, 2012) by Akira HINO, a master of Budo (=Japanese martial arts), who has been collaborating with William Forsythe, the choreographer of The Forsythe Company.

Below is part of what I thought I learned in the seminar, which I hope is not so mistaken. Or it is rather an attempt to interpret one Budo movement that was taught through the framework of Niklas Luhmann's systems theory. I don't pretend that I have mastered the movement to the level that Hino sensei requires, nor do I claim that my view below represents Hino sensei's Budo sufficiently.

Yet, I contend that a Budo movement can be understood as communication between two persons mediated by the body, that is usually considered two separate and independent bodies but rather should be considered integrated as one body communication system. I further argue that this communication between two persons mediated by one integrated body system is rather like linguistic communication, that is usually regarded as information transmission between two persons but rather should be regarded as one integrated communication system mediated by language.

The point where two bodies (in Budo) or two persons (in linguistic communication) becomes one body communication system or one linguistic communication system depends upon the condition of the interface between the two bodies or persons. As long as the interface is free of surface resistance (in Budo) or sense of irrelevance (in linguistic communication), two bodies or persons that are usually regarded as separate and independent becomes one communication system, which cannot be fully accountable by the sum of the two entities. I believe that the operation of communications systems are well explained among others by Luhmann's systems theory


2 How is Budo movement different from the standard movement?

What is Budo movement? In this section, I give a general account of Budo movement from the viewpoints of the antagonist and the protagonist, before I introduce a specific Budo movement that I analyze in the following section.


2.1 From the antagonist

Unlike standard movements performed by ordinary people, Budo movements are irresistible or unpredictable for the antagonist (=attacker). A big antagonist who overpowers a standard movement of the protagonist (=your Non-Budo movement) cannot even resist the power produced by a Budo movement; the power is different in quality and overwhelming for the antagonist. A quick antagonist who can move faster than the protagonist cannot predict a Budo movement; the protagonist moves earlier, if not faster, before the antagonist notices it, or even when a Budo movement is slow and clearly visible (as in the case of the Budo movement I'll introduce later), the antagonist loses the sense of control and cannot counteract, for the movement is different in quality and the antagonist cannot conceptualize how it will develop.

2.2 From the protagonist

Budo movements are also felt differently in quality for the protagonist (=you as a Budo practitioner). Although you have a master plan of conquring the attack of the antagonist to protect yourself, you don't yourself plan or know the specific moves of a Budo movement. A Budo movement is not conscious use of muscle powers (as is the case in a standard movement) but an autopoietic movement of the whole body, with or without your reflective awareness. Although a Budo movement is achieved, at least partially, by your body that is integrated as one body communication system with the body of the antagonist through the interface, a Budo movement is not your action in the usual sense that you have used your free will to consciously move the parts of your body. A Budo movement is not produced by your planned action, but by the internal logic of the whole integrated body. The body (of the two persons) moves in integration on its own with or without your clear awareness (the antagonist can only have confused awareness of being moved against his will).


3. How do you embody the Budo movement of an untwisting arm?


Now that I have described Budo movements in general, I'll introduce one Budo movement that was taught in the seminar (and which I can somehow manage to perform myself). The Budo movement is for a situation where you have your right arm, for example, twisted to the limit by the antagonist (attacker). In the seminar, you are supposed to keep other parts of the body unmoved for the sake of the exercise (i.e., your right arm is twisted and your right shoulder is put upward and forward, but otherwise you keep your stature unmoved and do not bend your knees or other parts).

If you try to untwist your right arm to escape from the holding in a standard way of conscious use of your muscle power, you cannot escape usually. Even if you're much bigger than the antagonist, you feel a lot of tension and friction, as does the antagonist.

However, if you do the Budo movement, you just untwist the arm effortlessly (you don't feel any tension and friction, and you're very calm in mind and body), and the attacker cannot resist, loses the sense of control and had to be turned around as long as he holds your arm firmly.

But how is it possible? Here are five points that I believe I learned.


3.1 Feel the line


As the Budo movement involves no conscious, intentional use of the muscles, you must not use your consciousness to plan or intend anything. Use your consciousness only to feel (Yes, Bruce Lee was right when he said "Don't think. Feel"). First, feel the line of the sensation of being twisted, between the gripped point of your right arm (or wrist) and the left shoulder (or near it) where the sensation ends. If you're tense, you can't feel the line; you only feel the friction at the gripped point and tension in various parts of your body. You need to be relaxed to accept the twist to feel the line.


3.2 Leave (or keep) the interface as it is

As you feel the line, you also have to feel the arm (or wrist) as is gripped and twisted. Feel just as it is. Feel the pressures, tensions, heat, moisture and all sorts of information from the antagonist and do nothing against them. Just feel.

Do not resist or try to change the situation. If you do, you change the state of the interface (the gripped part), and the change is immediately detected by the antagonist who will adjust the grip and hold you all the more firmly. Keep the interface as it is. As the Budo movement develops later, leave it as it is -- for me "To keep the interface as it is" is a better instruction when I first feel the sensation, and "To leave the interface as it is" is better when I let the Budo development develop.

The change of the interface is a sign that you've used your consciousness to resist intentionally. As the Budo movement is never achieved if you use consciousness in a conventionally, keeping the interface as it is is a very important indicator of the Budo movement. You may use your consciousness to feel, but never use it to think or plan.

Here I should probably introduce two different types of consciousness according to neuroscientists. Antonio Damasio, for example, distinguishes the core consciousness and the extended consciousness (See my articles on Self comes to mind and The feeling of what happens). These two types of consciousness roughly^(*) correspond with the primary consciousness and the higher-order consciousness (See my articles Wider than the sky and 'Consciousness as a process that is entailed by molecular interactions').

(*)In this article, I disregard the minor difference between Damasion's terms and Edelman's for the sake of the argument.

Core consciousness (or primary consciousness) is conscious awareness of the change of the body state. Extended consciousness (or higher-order consciousness) is extended from core consciousness in that it goes beyond 'here and now' of core consciousness and recalls backwards or plan heads, and it is higher than primary consciousness of simple awareness in that it describes its status by symbols (usually language).

 In ordinary expressions, 'feeling the sensation of the body' is probably for core consciousness (primary consciousness) and 'thinking with words on the basis of the sensation of the body' is for extended consciousness (or higher-order consciousness). So, when Bruce Lee says "Don't think. Feel," for example, he means that you should not use extended consciousness/higher-order consciousness, but just use core consciousness/primary consciousness. In other words, you should not neglect, but focus on your 'here and now' with the antagonist. Thinking about what to do with words is too slow and limited in information (words can only capture an extremely tiny part of the phenomenon). If you feel and are are true to the changes of the body, your movement is immediate and you respond to all sorts of changes your body (not your extended/higher-order consciousness) detects.

 

Figure 1: Damasio's theory of consciousness and self

Back to the Budo movement in Hino sensei's seminar, when you keep (or leave) the interface as it is, you only use core consciousness/primary consciousness just to feel. You should not, however, use extended consciousness/higher-order consciousness to think what you should to resist and how. If you do, your movement departs from Budo and becomes just conventional, which can be outpowered by the antagonist.


3.3 Let the line untwist itself from the furthest end


Now that you feel the line and the interface, you begin to let the line you feel untwist itself gradually from the furthest end (your left shoulder) and keep the interface unchanged. Again, you have to focus on the sensation of the point of the line as it gradually untwist itself.

The line is the image of your twisted body. As your body is twisted by the antagonist and transformed into a very unnatural state, the body tries to restore itself to regain the natural position. Because what constitutes your body is complex connections of multitudes of units (muscles, fascia, bones, cells and all sorts of things), untwisting movements are very diverse. Each movement may be not very powerful, but the combination of all movements are. In addition, because the power is not uni-directional (think of a robot-like movement of your body with your conscious plan), but ever-changing, multi-directional beyond the recognition of you and the antagonist, you don't know how your body will move as it untwist itself, nor does the antagonist consciously think how he can resist.

So, you just let your body do its job. You use your core consciousness/primary consciousness to feel the line and the interface so as not to let your extended consciousness/higher-order consciousness do other counter-effective things (for example, recalling your past conventional movement and thinking to apply it to this situation). You just observe the body (the integrated body communication system of your body and the antagonist's) and keep the interface as it is, for it is the sign that your extended consciousness/higher-order consciousness is not doing a wrong thing.


3.4 No intentional moves


As the twisted body untwist itself, your elbow drops and bends, and your palm turns upwards. You may think it is advantageous to drop your elbow or turn rotate your arm deliberately, but don't, as it is a conventional, conscious use of muscles. If you've been training Aikido, you may think that it is advantageous , which it is, to step forward and turn to the antagonist to use the weight of your body for resistance, but you're advised not to do so, because this is an exercise to learn a Budo movement, a non-conscious move of the body with your conscious monitor, not just to untwist the arm. If you haven't learnt Budo at all, do not ever try to move intentionally, for it will be outpowered by the antagonist who are in a better position (i.e. he's twisted your arm already).


3.5 No intentional power


This point is the other side of the previous point, which is a confirmation of the first three points of this Budo movement. Do not try to use your intentional power (which you want to turn to your intentional move). "Keep the interface as it is" is important here as well, for as soon as you try to use your intentional power, the state of the interface changes and the antagonist will notice it immediately.

One further exercise of this Budo movement, is you have your right arm twisted by a first antagonist and have your left arm held by a second antagonist. The job of the first antagonist is to stop the untwisting (the same as the original exercise), but the job of the second antagonist is to detect the change of the interface. If he notices any change in the interface of your left arm and his hand, he slaps your left arm with the other hand. The change of the interface is a sign that you're beginning to use your intentional power, and he let you know that by the slap.

If you keep these five points, you may probably be able to do this Budo movement in some way or other within 10 minutes or so. (But remember: this is only one elementary movements. You cannot of course be a master of Budo in 10 minutes!)

As you learn to do this Budo movement yourself, you may wonder: Who's the agent of this Budo movement? In this Budo movement, you don't have the usual sense of your agency, for you don't (and can't) use your conscious, free will to move your body. Rather, your body moves. But it's not that your body moves alone; your body moves only in relation to the body of the antagonist, and you have to keep (not disconnect) the relation by observing the interface. So, it's not that your body moves against the body of the antagonist, either. Rather your body moves with the body of the antagonist.

So if there's anything like the center of this movement , it's not your free will or your body. It is not the free will or the body of the antagonist, either. It is rather the integration of the two bodies (to constitute one body communication system). It is the maintenance of the body communication system (as is known by the same interface state) that makes further communication of the Budo movement. Bodies per se do not communicate in a Budo movement (nor does two conscious minds). It is communication of the bodies that makes communication of the Budo movements: communication between two persons mediated by one integrated body system.

 Here, we're reminded of Luhmann's provocative words: people do not communicate; communication communicates. I'll briefly introduce Luhmann's systems theory below in the belief that the theory is a good framework to understand Budo movements as body communication (and also to understand linguistic communication, as well)^(**).

 (**) With the limit of my academic competency, I cannot claim with absolute confidence that I'm offering here the 'correct' understanding of Luhmann's systems theory, although Luhmann himself might probably laugh at the suggestion of the 'correct' understanding. Those who are interested in Luhmann's theory are advised to read his own works. (Original German worksand English translations).



4 Luhmann's systems theory


4.1 The standard ideas of linguistic communication and the individual


In order to explain Luhmann's systems theory as a framework to understand communication, let's confirm our conventional view of linguistic communication, a proto-type of communication.

Our conventional view is influenced much by the code model of communication by Shannon and Weaver. Communication is regarded as the transmission of information from the sender (encoder) to the receiver (decoder). The sender and the receiver are two separate individuals that are only connected through the channel of transmission. The information is a neutral code, used in all sorts of context in the same way. In linguistic communication, the sender and the receiver are two separate and independent persons as the individual. The information is encoded by the sender into a language and is decoded by the receiver. Communication is deemed successful when the identical information is transmitted, unaffected by encoding,  channel, or decoding. Communicative competence is mostly attributed to individual psychological ability, and communication is considered the result of the simple sum of individual psychological abilities of the two individuals. A study of communication, it is further assumed, is to be a study of the mind of an independent person.


4.2 The three systems that are involved in linguistic communication


Luhmann's systems theory does not regard an individual person as the basic unit of linguistic communication. Linguistic communication is dependent upon individual persons, but it is not the simple sum of performance or psychological ability of each person, and therefore, an individual person is not considered the basic unit of linguistic communication.

An individual person is to be further analyzed, according to Luhmann. What we usually regard as a 'person' has two aspects: biological and psychological.

Natural scientists are mostly concerned with the biological aspect of a person. They regard a person as a biological or physiological system, and now even psychiatrist may prefer pharmacological treatments to existential therapy. (Personally I'm interested in Harry Stack Sullivan whose theory of psychiatry is based on interpersonal relationship. But I'm not sure whether his theory is cherished by the majority of psychiatrists now when The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) seems to rule psychiatry.

The other aspect of a person, the psychological aspect, is kept mostly for non-scientific scholars of humanities, or simply ordinary people. Although naturalism is quite strong, complete reduction of consciousness to physical phenomena is not shared by all researchers, and the nature of consciousness remains as a hard problem.

In his systems theory, Luhmann distinguishes three types of system: Life systems (organisms), psychic systems, and social systems. For the sake of argument, I'll paraphrase the three systems as biological systems, consciousness systems, and communication systems respectively, without, I hope, distorting Luhmann's theory. I'll take the issue of linguistic communication by humans, and use a human body as an example of biological systems, a conscious mind (both core/primary consciousness and extended/higher-order consciousness) as that of psychic systems, and linguistic communication as that of social systems.

One reason why Luhmann distinguishes these systems is that the three systems are autopoietic (self-organizing; only a self can create itself) respectively. For example, although linguistic communication depends upon human bodies and human consciousnesses, communication cannot be reduced, as I'll explain later, to the sum of the individual conscious states or the states of the individual human bodies. It is only communication that creates further communication; human consciousnesses or human bodies alone cannot create communication -- only communication can create communication, and in this sense, communication is autopoietic.

Likewise, only your consciousness can create your new consciousness; your biological states must be translated into your conscious state to form new consciousness; development in linguistic communication must also be translated into your conscious state. Consciousness depends upon and gets affected by a human body, and it also gets affected by and may even need linguistic communication (at least as far as the development of extended/higher-order consciousness is concerned). But consciousness is not neither the state of the body nor the state of linguistic communication. In order to form consciousness, you simply need a state of consciousness. A state of consciousness may be a translation from the body state or the communication state, but it needs to be a conscious state itself. A consciousness system is autopoietic in itself.

Also, only your body can make your body. You cannot obtain the strong muscles of a lion by eating its meat. You must digest it (i.e., transform the meat into the units that can interact within your body system. You have to make the meat of the lion part of yourself if you want to obtain strong muscles like a lion's (of course, you need to exercise as well). So our human body as a biological system is also autopoietic in its own way.


4.2.1 Biological system (life system or organism)


Our biological system is our human body. It is a physiological system that the mainstream Western medical science deals with. It is a basis of a consciousness system, which is a basis of a linguistic communication system. It may be affected by a consciousness system or a linguistic communication system, but it is only a biological system itself that makes itself.


4.2.2 Consciousness system (psychic system)

Our consciousness system is our human consciousness (some non-human animals have core/primary consciouseness and even (non-linguistic) extended/higher-order consciousness, but we don't deal with them here). Consciousness requires our body, as Damasio, for example, explains, but consciousness is not just an expression of the current body state. When you find and read a writing and changes your mind, your consciousness was affected not just by the body state but also by the paper outside your body. As media ecology (Wikipedia and my blog articles) explains, media influence our being, and we are beings with the extended mind and the world now contains so many technologies that enables advance use of extended/higher-order consciousness.

So I believe it is quite reasonable to assume that humans are not just biological systems; humans are consciousness systems as well that self-organize new consciousness from the past consciousness. In order to understand humans, you need at least both biological and psychological aspects (you also need communication aspect, as I hope will be clear later). Humans are not just a consciousness system, either; consciousness needs the functions of the biological system where it is embodied. You need to understand the functions of our body to understand consciousness.


4.2.3 Communication system (social system)


A linguistic communication, as an example of a communication system, requires (at least) two conscious minds, which further require two human bodies. Figure 2 below summarizes the interaction of the three autopoietic systems.

Figure 2: The interaction between biological, consciousness, and communication systems.

I'll explain more about the communication system in the next section by introducing theories of pragmatics.



5 Linguistic communication explained by pragmatics and Relevance Theory


Let's review theories of pragmatics and see how Luhmann's theory is compatible with them.


5.1 Speaker's meaning may not be known to the speaker herself


The theory of pragmatics tells that 'meaning' contains literal meaning (conventional dictionary meaning) and speaker's meaning (the meaning that the speaker intended besides what the literal meaning is assumed to convey). One of the examples most often used is an utterance "It's hot", with its literal meaning 'THE TEMPERATURE IS HIGH' and its speaker's meaning 'PLEASE OPEN THE WINDOW', and we assume that the literal meaning and the speaker's meaning are shared between the speaker and the listener.

But situations are more complicated in the real world communication. The speaker's meaning is often interpreted in a way that the speaker did not intend. Even the literal meaning is often not shared completely, and the listener may focus on different aspects of the denotation and connotation of the word that the speaker did not exactly mean.

Communication does not always work as you intend. You may have your own logic that you believe should be applied in linguistic communication, but your logic is not necessarily the logic of the communication. Neither you nor your interlocutor controls communication completely. Communication may work and develop beyond the anticipation of the participants (This is a reason why humans should not be regarded as the basic unit of linguistic communication). Linguistic communication, as it were, has its own life and logic and it creates itself in its own way, beyond the control of the participants; it is an autopoietic system. (As I write this essay with my conscious mind and my biological body, both extended by Information Communication Technology, I never know what communication this essay will bring).

To take a simpler example of interactive communication between the two persons in the same time-space, neither participants knows or controls the development of linguistic communication, although, in a sense, the linguistic communication is constituted by the utterances of the two as the results of their biological and conscious systems. Like your interlocutor, you are quite aware of what you're saying, but consciousness is not sufficient, either yours or your interlocutor's, or even both of them, to make linguistic communication. The words and phrases you use may have denotations, connotations or associations that you're not currently aware of, and they may influence the development of communication.

The linguistic communication is now a new autopoietic system. You are not the agent of the linguistic communication system in the way you are the agent of your consciousness system (even in the consciousness system, you may not be a complete agent in the sense the term "free will" suggests, but let's not talk about this here). 'You', either as a consciousness system, a biological system or whatever it may mean, are involved in linguistic communication, but you're never the master of it. In fact, no human beings, either alone or combined, are the master of linguistic communication. If there's a master of linguistic communication -- a debatable proposition --, it is linguistic communication itself that is the master of linguistic communication.


5.2 The sense of relevance as the interface condition of linguistic communication


But if linguistic communication is an autopoietic system on its own, beyond its participants (human beings), when does the utterances from two separate persons becomes a linguistic communication system as an autopoieteic system? How do we know when some sentences are not just a random collection of linguistic productions but an instance of linguistic communication? In other words, what makes communication communication?

My answer now is that the sense of relevance is the interface condition of linguistic communication. That is, as long as either side of participants (preferably, both sides) believes that relevance is kept in their linguistic interaction, the linguistic interaction makes communication.

The term 'relevance' is of course from the Relevance Theory. All participants expect (often unknowingly) that utterances that they process must be worthy of processing (must be 'relevant'), and that other participants must be behaving according to this principle. When you listen to an ambiguous utterance, you're motivated to choose the meaning that seems the most relevant to you. When your interlocutor looks you in the eye and says something that is not very clear in meaning, you're motivated to seek for whatever relevance it may have. (For further information on Relevance Theory, see Dan Sperber's online resource (http://www.dan.sperber.fr/?p=93).



6 Communication mediated by language and communication mediated by the body

So keeping the sense of relevance unbroken and ceasing to believe that you're the agent of linguistic communication are the conditions to make and keep linguistic communication. But doesn't this sound like the Budo movement as a communication system?

I certainly believe it does. More than that, I believe both linguistic communication and body communication of Budo can be generalized and categorized as instances of the communication system in general.

If you want to work on other person through the body (as in the case of a self-defense in Budo), you should not just move your body as you wish. Rather, you should make your body integrated with the body of the other person. You can do so if you focus on the interface of the two bodies, and keep it unaffected by your plan or thought (the use of extended/higher-order consciousness); you just let your body respond, not your free will (another use of extended/higher-order consciousness). Then it works. (Really, it is "it", not you, that works and I claim this "it" is a communication system of two persons mediated by the body).

Likewise, if you want to work on other person through language, you should not just say what you want to say. Rather you should integrate your utterances with the utterances of the other person. You can do so if you focus on the sense of relevance and keep that interface undestroyed by not imposing your own logic or not refusing to find relevance in the utterances of the other. Let the words, both the other's and yours, be the master of linguistic communication, not your own wishes. Let the words mean what they mean both in the senses of literal meaning and speaker's meaning.  Don't resist with words by imposing your own wishes.  Do nothing against the words, do everything with the words.

 When you listen, don't impose and stick to your version of the literal meaning and your own interpretation of the speaker's meaning. Hear the words as they develop in communication. When you speak, don't just assume that your utterances will always understood as you intended, not just in the speaker's meaning but also in the literal meaning. As you speak, take a good look at the facial expression and other body expressions of your interlocutor to see the sense of relevance is kept between him and you. Always make your best efforts to keep the sense of relevance, and just use words only as long as the sense of relevance is not destroyed. And then, I'd argue, it works; a communication system mediated by the body, 'linguistic communciation' as we call it, works.

Luhmann's systems theory explains both body communication (Budo movements) and linguistic communication by distinguishing the consciousness system and the communication system. Budo movements and linguistic communication work best when the participants use their consciousness only to observe the interface of their communication and avoid much use of their own free will. The point is let the body or the words do their own job, not your wishes, for sometimes their job is beyond the imagination of your wishes. The body and the words have more capacity than you think.

As I'm about to finish this essay, I now begin to wonder whether I've imposed my own wishes too much as I wrote. Did I respond to the words I wrote as I kept writing? Or rather, did I just humbly observe how my words responded to each other to develop writing while keeping relevance? Did I try sufficiently to suppress my ego so that it didn't distort communication?

Pat Metheny says that you have to be a good listener of your own music as you play. You may have to be a good reader of your words when you write. I now wonder if I was a good reader of my words in this essay.



Related post:
Comparing Foreign Language Communication to Budo (Martial Arts)
http://yosukeyanase.blogspot.jp/2012/03/comparing-foreign-language.html

Three MLJ articles by Firth and Wagner (1997, 1998, and 2007)

OPENING PANDORA'S BOX

Firth and Wagner (1997) has developed into a seminal paper in applied linguistics to produce many repercussions. Firth and Wagner have also written their own responses in 1998 and 2007.

On Discourse, Communication, and (Some) Fundamental Concepts in SLA Research
ALAN FIRTH, JOHANNES WAGNER
The Modern Language Journal
Volume 81, Issue 3, pages 285-300, Autumn 1997
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-4781.1997.tb05480.x
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-4781.1997.tb05480.x/abstract



SLA Property: No Trespassing!
ALAN FIRTH, JOHANNES WAGNER
The Modern Language Journal
Volume 82, Issue 1, pages 91-94, Spring 1998
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-4781.1998.tb02598.x
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-4781.1998.tb02598.x/abstract



Second/Foreign Language Learning as a Social Accomplishment: Elaborations on a Reconceptualized SLA
ALAN FIRTH, JOHANNES WAGNER
The Modern Language Journal
Volume 91, Issue Supplement s1, pages 800-819, December 2007
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-4781.2007.00670.x
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-4781.2007.00670.x/abstract

The 1997 paper by Firth and Wagner was written (at least partly) as one of the responses to claims by "mainstream" SLA researchers such as Long (1990), for example, who called for "theory culling" on the basis of "established" and "normal" scientific standards. (Firth and Wagner, 1997, pp. 285-286). Firth and Wagner argued that what is more necessary for SLA was a "more critical discussion of its own presuppositions, methods, and fundamental (and implicitly accepted) concepts (Firth and Wagner, 1997, p. 286). In this sense, the paper was a philosophical examination on the fundamental issues of SLA, which pointed out, among others, that "the centripetal forces of the individual-cognitive remain irresistible for SLA" and that SLA adopted "Chomsky's programmatic statements on the cognitive, autonomic nature of the mind as its research agenda." (Firth and Wagner, 1997, p. 288)

Their argument was rather modest because it did not call for demolition of what they criticized but only wanted to redress bias and imbalance in SLA studies.

We do not argue that such theoretical predilections or methodological practices are in and of themselves erroneous or flawed, and that, as such, they should be eschewed. Rather, we point out their striking predominance within the field, leading to a general methodological bias and theoretical imbalance in SLA studies that investigate acquisition through interactive discourse. (Firth and Wagner, 1997, p. 288)

Firth and Wagner wanted to question the binary assumption like "social or individual/cognitive," "use or learning" or "native or nonnative."

In essence, we call for work within SLA that endeavours to adopt what we have referred to as a holistic approach to and outlook on language and language acquisition, an approach that problematizes and explores the conventional binary distinction between "social" and "individual" (or cognitive) approaches to language use and language learning, that attends to the dynamics as well as the summation of language acquisition, that is more emically and interactionally attuned, and that is critically sensitive towards the theoretical status of fundamental concepts (particularly "learner," "native," "nonnative," and "interlanguage"). (Firth and Wagner, 1997, p. 296)

Their paper was, as I claimed, a philosophical analysis.

It is surely time to take seriously the possibility of deconstructing such dichotomies as use versus acquisition, sociolinguistics versus psycholinguistics, and language use versus communicative act. (Firth and Wagner, 1998, p. 93)

But nothing irritates people more than philosophy does (particularly, deconstruction!); The reaction of Firth and Wagner (1997) was like opening Pandora's Box. An the responses were more or less divided into supportive comments and flat dismissals. The latter claimed that Firth and Wagner (1997) was not even talking about SLA, from which mainstream critics excluded language use.

The consensus of our critics seems to be that our arguments have been staged from "outside" SLA proper; that is, that our position is related to research in second language use, but not to acquisition per se. (Firth and Wagner, 1998, p. 91)

Given the modesty of their claims, as far as I can see in hindsight, in Firth and Wagner (1997), it is rather surprising that the paper "touched a proverbial raw nerve within as well as around the periphery of the second language acquisition (SLA) community" (Firth and Wagner, 2007, p. 800).


As I said, philosophical analysis sometimes irritates people for it questions something they take just for granted. (Philosophy is always a gadfly). But considering the impact that the paper produced, I suspect that the mainstream researchers were not just annoyed by philosophical enqury but felt uneasy because they thought they might lose the vested interests they had earned. With the ontological and epistemological enrichment that Firth and Wagner wanted to bring into SLA studies, the mainstream researchers, I imagine, felt that they would lose their special legitimacy as an independent academic discipline, free from other learning sciences and practical concerns.

In fact, in the early 1970s, when the umbrella term language was replaced by the technical term acquisition, SLA accomplished three things rather elegantly: (a) it defined itself as a discipline that produces knowledge about this special phenomenon called acquisition; (b) it cemented its identity as a distinct discipline and secured a foothold in the world of scientific research; and (c) it all but cut off possible links to learning theories residing outside its own (self-constructed) disciplinary boundaries (Rampton, 1997a). (Firth and Wagner, 2007, p. 806)

But this is only a guess about academic politics, and we should focus more on theoretical issues. So below I pick up two aspects from the three MLJ papers written by Firth and Wagner: ontology and epistemology.




ONTOLOGY

As Firth and Wagner themselves say, Firth and Wagner (1997) was an attempt to reconceptualize SLA studies "that would enlarge the ontological and empirical parameters of the field." (Firth and Wagner, 1997, p. 285).


Ontological reconceptualization includes the nature of communication. The cognitivism typically holds "individual psychology" and "code-model" and regards communication as a product of two internal cognitive mechanisms (i.e. speaker and listener).

The term "individual psychology" is used, for example, by Chomsky. On the page where he introduces the three basic questions of generative grammar ((i) What constitutes knowledge of language?; (ii) How is knowledge of language acquired?; (iii) How is knowledge of language put to use?), Chomsky states that the standpoint of generative grammar is that of individual psychology (Chomsky 1986, p. 3).

The notion of individual psychology is a modern conception, and certainly not the only one. We have to ask once again whether the conception is best for a study of communication, even if it is best for generative grammar. Code-model, also known as Shannon-Weaver model is another modern conception, but it was seriously challenged by Relevance Theory by Sperber and Willson (1986), and it is now generally agreed that the code-model is not a satisfactory explanatory framework for linguistic communication.

So we should rather see communication as conjoint interaction, something that happens between persons, not in persons.

Because interaction and communication are per definition conjointly and publicly produced, structured, and made meaningful, communicative "problems," we suggest, are likely to be recognized as problems in interaction. In this sense, it may be more useful to view problems in communication as contingent social phenomena, as intersubjective entities, and not invariably as "things" possessed by individuals. (Firth and Wagner, 1997, p. 291)

This reconceptualization involves an ontological reflection. People generally take a noun (or what a noun represents) as "substantive", ie., something substantial that must have its physical extensions in the physical world. So communication, we assume, also must have its physical basis. It must be either the airwaves (the sound) in the space between the speakers, or the brain activities in the speakers. As the airwaves can be regarded as a mere manifestation of cognition in the brain, people may believe that the brain activities must be the physical basis of communication.

If this sort of physical ontology is all we have, it must be not easy at all to accept intersubjective entities, as Firth and Wagner state above ("Subjectivity" must be another problem for physicalists, but this is another story. See my article:"Where is Self, and what is it?" No, it's rather "How is Self?": Luhmann's theory of autopoiesis, if you're interested.)

However, other ontological frameworks must be possible, and I'd like to present Niklas Luhmann's systems theory here briefly.

Communication, according to Systems theory, 'operates' not on the level of human beings, but on the level of communication itself.

It is, empirically speaking (from an observer’s perspective), communication that constitutes communication, and not human beings as individuals. Of course, human beings are necessary for communication to take place - but it is not they who are “operating” within communication. They are, rather, the external condition sine qua non of communication, but not an internal element of communication and society.

Moeller, Hans-Georg (2011, pp. 7-8).

Linguistic communication requires human beings with conscious minds (or consciousness). Consciousness in turn requires biological activities of the body (the brain, in particular). But Luhmann argues that neither consciousness or the biological activities as such communicate. It is the operation of communication itself that constitutes communication. Communication, like other autopoietic systems, is self-referential and self-organizing.

Communication (a social or communication system), Luhmann says, is 'structurally coupled' with conscious mind (a psychic system); Communication and conscious mind are connected in a very unique way. It is through consciousness that communication (linguistic communication, in our case) starts. But as communication starts, it begins to have its own life, as it were, as is obvious in cases where development of communication betrays a speaker's intention.

Consciousness, in turn, is in structural coupling with the biological brain activities. It is through the brain activities that conscious mind starts. Yet, as conscious mind began to operate on its own, it gains a special ontological status; consciousness can only be experienced by the owner of the neurons; the observers of the neural activities, however objective they may be, cannot experience the consciousness produced by the neurons. In this sense, we are not to equate consciousness with physiology of neurons per se.

So, in a strict sense at least, communication cannot be sufficiently explained on the level of conscious mind or on that of brain activities. We need to examine communication by and of itself to explain communication. Cognitive science of the mind or neuroscience of the brain may be a great help to a study of communication, but neither of them constitutes a study of communication. A study of communication must examine communication as it appears in the public space. So, cognitivism, though it may have been the most powerful explanatory theory, should not be the only explanatory framework for communication; it can only be subsidiary.

The structural coupling between the brain as a living system, the mind as a psychic system, and society as a communication system seems to be of a specific structure with the mind somehow “in-between” the other two systems. Whatever “happens” within our brains seems to be first somehow “translated” into conscious information (feelings, thoughts) before it can, in turn, irritate communication and be processed by communication as social information. It seems that the mind is some kind of filter between the brain, on the one hand, and communication on the other.

Moeller, Hans-Georg (2011, p. 20).

Other ontological issues include the concept of the native speaker (NS) (and its counterpart: the nonnative speaker (NNS)). NS and NNS are certainly idealizations of identity, but not the only possible ones. Rather we should ask whether they are specific enough or too monolithic for our study, that is, learning and use of English as a lingua franca in these diverse and changing global settings.

NS and NNS are blanket terms, implying homogeneity throughout each group, and clear-cut distinctions between them. (Firth and Wagner, 1997, p. 291)

We may also have to examine the ontology of 'competence'. As we have questioned the concept of the native speaker, we should also examine the concept of the 'native-like competence' and that of 'interlanguage,' whose end-point is the language of the 'native speaker'.

Implicit here is the (at least disputable) assumption that target or NS competence is constant, fully developed and complete. (Firth and Wagner, 1997, p. 292)

There is more to say about 'competence.' Firth and Wagner argue that language competence is transitional, situational, and dynamic and are reluctant to give it a static, fixed ontological status.

If, as we argue, language competence is a fundamentally transitional, situational, and dynamic entity, then any language users will always be "learners" in some respects. New or partly known registers, styles, language-related tasks, lexical items, terminologies and structures, routinely confront language users, calling for the contingent adaptation and transformation of existing knowledge and competence, and the acquisition of new knowledge. (Firth and Wagner, 1998, p. 288)

Implications of this argument include, as stated above, diffusion (or deconstruction) of the distinction between language learning and language use.

After all, we may still be in the agenda set by Hymes in 1972.

Here the performance of a person is not identical with a behavioral record, or with the imperfect or partial realization of individual competence. It takes into account the interaction between competence (knowledge, ability for use), the competence of others, and the cybernetic and emergent properties of events themselves. A performance, as an event, may have properties (patterns and dynamics) not reducible to terms of individual or standardized competence. (Hymes, 1972, p.283)

EPISTEMOLOGY

The other aspect I'd like to pick out from Firth and Wagner's papers is epistemology: what counts as knowledge, scientific knowledge in particular, which is supposed to lead, ultimately, to truth.


Of the criticism given to Firth and Wagner (and which they cite in their 2007 paper), I found Poulisse's worthy of attention, for he raises the issue of the criterion of a research.

Poulisse (1997) also offered a defense of the psycholinguistic approach in response to our arguments, maintaining that "the task of all researchers [is] to not only describe, but also explain and predict phenomena" (p. 325) and "it would definitely not do to just look at particular and local phenomena and find specific explanations for each of them" (p. 325). (Firth and Wagner, 2007, p. 802)

I believe this notion is the modern view of science (including of course Chomskyan scheme). Researches require more than description of particulars; they need explanatory theories of the general (or universal) which enable prediction and falsification.

In many areas of enquiry, though, this modern view of science has been seriously challenged by Chaos theory (Complexity theory), and its impact is evident in applied linguistics, too (Larsen-Freeman, 1997, 2007).

Actually, Chomsky himself says that science only works for simple, non-complex problems.

Science is a very strange activity. It only works for simple problems. Even in the hard sciences, when you move beyond the simplest structures, it becomes very descriptive. By the time you get to big molecules, for example, you are mostly describing things. The idea that deep scientific analysis tells you something about problems of human beings and our lives and our inter-relations with one another and so on is mostly pretence in my opinion -- self-serving pretence which is itself a technique of domination and exploitation and should be avoided. (Chomsky, 2000, p. 2)

If this is the case, which I think it is, when the rigorous mainstream cognitivism (or whatever that claims to be exact science) attempts to instruct teachers and learners what to do, they may be using their authority as a 'technique of domination and exploitation.'

In addition, the nature of communication, as opposed to the linguistically idealized notion of language, may contradict the spirit of universal explanation and call for particular description.

in situated social practices, use and learning are inseparable parts of the interaction. They appear to be afforded by topics and tasks, and they seem to be related to specific people, with particularized identities, with whom new ways of behaving occur as the unfolding talk demands.

Studying learning as a social accomplishment shifts our understanding of learning from the construct of a linguistic system or a competence that serves all the speaker's purposes. Instead, the development of social relations, the mutual consistency of linguistic resources and tasks, and the specific biography of the language learners come to the foreground. This strand of research has gained momentum over the last 10 years, and quite clearly, much more research into the specifics of social interactions in L2 environments is clearly necessary in the years to come. (Firth and Wagner, 2007, p. 812)

All in all, papers by Firth and Wagner have certainly expanded the horizons of SLA and applied linguistics, despite persistent resistance or flat dismissal by some cognitivists. Many applied linguists now uses terms like "ecological approaches to SLA" (Kramsch, 2002)," "chaos and complexity" (Larsen-Freeman, 1997, 2007), "multimodality," "contingency," or "fluidity" . We're certainly richer in conceptions.

However, mere plurality of conceptions may just lead to confusion and the need for "theory culling" again. Different perspectives of SLA must compete and complement with each other.

We are, then, witness to a natural progression, an intellectual evolution, if one will, where successful paradigm evolve (and sometimes fracture) through both support and critique. (Firth and Wagner, 2007, p. 813)

If we leave our theories to the evolutionarly selection pressures, we must make it certain that the pressures are not biased and that the selections are open. If there's one thing we learn (or should learn) from debates initiated by Firth and Wagner (1997), it should be, I think, the virtue of open-mindedness.

REFERENCES

Chomsky （1986). Knowledge of Language. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.

Chomsky, N. (2000). The architecture of language. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Hymes, D. (1972). On Communicative Competence. In J. Pride and J. Holmes (eds.), Sociolinguistics: Selected readings (pp. 269-93). Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Kramsch, C. (Ed.). (2002). Language acquisition and language socialization: Ecological perspectives. London: Continuum.

Larsen-Freeman, D. (1997). Chaos/complexity science and second language acquisition. Applied Linguistics, 18, 141-165.

Larsen-Freeman, D. (2007). On the complementarity of chaos/complexity theory and dynamic systems theory in understanding the second language ac- quisition process. Bilingualism: Language and cognition, 10, 35-37

Long, M. H. (1990). The least a second language acqui- sition theory needs to explain. TESOL Quarterly, 24, 649-666.

Moeller, Hans-Georg (2011). Luhmann Explained: From Souls to Systems. Open Court. Kindle Edition.

Sperber, D and Willson, D. (1986) Relevance: Communication and Cognition. Wiley-Blackwell

David Block (2003) "The Social Turn in Second Language Acquisition"

[This post is to help students in my Intensive Course "Language and Society" (Aug 27 - 30, 2012) who will read the following book. As I believe that Abstracts of academic papers belong to the public domain of the web, I paste abstracts of the papers that are cited in or related to the arguments in the book. I always try to seek a good balance between copyright and copyleft.]

TEXTBOOK

David Block (2003)

The Social Turn in Second Language Acquisition

Georgetown University Press

Preface

The aim of the book: to explore the prospect of a social turn in Second Language Acquisition (SLA) and to have a less less partial view is what SLA is.



Chapter 1: Introduction


1.1 THE SOCIAL TURN IN APPLIED LINGUISTICS: FOLLOWING THE LEAD OF SOCIOLINGUISTICS


"Applied linguistics" according to Rampton (1997)

Returning in applied linguistics
International Journal of Applied Linguistics
Volume 7, Issue 1, pages 3-25, June 1997

Abstract

What do we now mean by the term ‘applied linguistics’? Can we provide a coherent characterisation that says it's more than simply all and anything that isn't ‘autonomous’/‘core’? Should we even try? Nik Coupland's paper, “Language, ageing and ageism: a project for applied linguistics?”, provides a focus for reflection on this issue, and the present paper serves as an introduction, setting up some of the context for the subsequent discussion. As its point of departure, the paper cites the Widdowson-Brumfit view that AL should serve as a point of interdisciplinary synthesis where theories with their own integrity are developed in close interaction with users and professionals. There are, however, reasons for doubting how far this has succeeded in the area that is sometimes regarded as most typically AL (SLA research and L2 teacher education), and so it ‘s important to look to other fields of AL. In fact, a good model can be found in Hymes’ 1972 vision of a linguistics that is ‘socially constituted’, and the relevance and force of this has now been enhanced by much wider developments in social science. A serious commitment to dialogue outside the academy is now characteristic of a great many programmes of basic, specialist research, and while there is still great value in Strevens' view of AL as a relatively open space where a large variety of practical interest groups, researchers and development projects can meet, there are no longer any grounds for assuming that the generalist in applied linguistics should hold the central place.

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1473-4192.1997.tb00101.x/abstract

Widdowson's reply (1998)

Retuning, calling the tune, and paying the piper: a reaction to Rampton

International Journal of Applied Linguistics
Volume 8, Issue 1, pages 131-140, June 1998
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1473-4192.1998.tb00124.x/abstract

1.2 A SOCIAL TURN FOR SLA?

Examine the general division of opinion between "those who see SLA primarily in psycholinguistics terms (e.g. Beretta, Gass, Gregg, Long) and those who see it as both psycholinguistic and social in nature (Block, Lantolf, van Lier)". (p. 3).

Addtional question: Do you think this division is only about the addtion of the social dimension? What can (or should) we learn from this division?

ALAN BERETTA
“As God said, and I think, rightly...”' Perspectives on Theory Construction in SLA: An Introduction
Applied Linguistics (1993) 14(3): 221-224 doi:10.1093/applin/14.3.221

This is a good time for a special issue on theory construction in SLA, because by now there is uncertainty as to whether there are many theories of SLA or none.Not only that, there are divisions in the field regarding the nature and purpose ofSLA inquiry: some seek explanatory principles and posit sophisticated theories which yield testable predictions; others collect 'facts' and deliver endlesslyrenewable promissory notes to the effect that, atop a mountain of facts, a theoretical citadel will one day be constructed. Some assume the purpose of SLA theorizing is better theory; others, to ameliorate real-world problems (reducing discrimination, improving pedagogy, etc.). (p. 211)
http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/content/14/3.toc

Leo van Lier
Forks and Hope: Pursuing Understanding in Different Ways
Applied Linguistics (1994) 15 (3): 328-346.

Abstract
This paper comments on an earlier issue of Applied Linguistics (14/3, September 1993) on the theme of theory construction in SLA. The points made here are intended to apply to general assumptions common in our field and reflected at various points in the contributions to that issue. A perspective on theory construction is introduced that is different from those addressed there, but that needs to be included for the sake of balance. In this perspective, some common views are examined critically: the natural sciences as a success story worthy of emulation; the merits of diversity and homogeneity; the relationships between theory and practice; the nature of explanation (and the role of experimentation and causality in this); and the evaluation of theories. Ways and purposes of theorizing are addressed that complement the views expressed in Volume 14/3. It is a critical perspective, characterized by the ethical foundations of theory construction (and scientific activity in general) and the grounding of theory in practical activity, and it requires a different approach to judging the quality of work in our field.
http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/content/15/3/328.abstract

DAVID BLOCK
Not so Fast: Some Thoughts on Theory Culling, Relativism, Accepted Findings and the Heart and Soul of SLA
Applied Linguistics (1996) 17(1): 63-83 doi:10.1093/applin/17.1.63

Abstract
This paper is meant to be a response to claims made by several prominent applied linguists in recent articles about second language acquisition (SLA) research These claims are as follows (1) The existence of multiple theories in SLA research is problematic (Beretta 1991), and the field should be united around a single theory or a few theories (Long 1993), (2) The alternative to such a concerted effort is a relativistic stance where ‘anything goes’ (Long 1990a, 1993, Beretta 1991), (3) There is now an ample body of ‘accepted findings’ which a good theory of SLA will have to account for (Long 1990a, Larsen Freeman and Long 1991), (4) The existence of ‘accepted findings’ means that SLA researchers should get on with the task of putting the findings to the test, attempting to falsify them through replication studies I begin by disagreeing with each of these suggestions and then go on to elaborate my own view of SLA research This view sees SLA as a process of exploration (Schumann 1993) and speculation (Davies 1991) rather than one of discovery and proof In addition, I suggest that SLA is multi-dimensional in nature, including not only cognitive mechanisms (Long 1990a), but also the social psychology of the classroom (Allwright 1989) I end by considering how SLA research carried out according to the principles I outline might be evaluated
http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/content/17/1/63.abstract

KEVIN R. GREGG
Taking Explanation Seriously; or, Let a Couple of Flowers Bloom
Applied Linguistics (1993) 14 (3): 276-294.
doi: 10.1093/applin/14.3.276

Abstract

It is usually thought that one goal of a theory is to explain the phenomena within the theory's domain. Hence one criterion for assessing a putative theory of second language acquisition (SLA), for instance, or for assessing SLA research conducted within a given theoretical perspective, is the degree to which it can be seen as a successful contribution to such an explanation.

Unfortunately, a good deal of SLA research has been less than thoroughgoing in its commitment to explanatory goals, making it harder to judge the value of the research in question. This paper discusses some of the issues and problems involved in scientific explanation in general, and their relevance to SLA theory in particular. The relation between SLA and the property theory/ transition theory distinction (Cummins 1983) is examined, the inadequacies of the deductive-nomological (D-N) model (Hempel 1965) are detailed, and an approach is outlined toward using Upton's (1991) account of inference to the best explanation as a guide to evaluating SLA theoretical frameworks.
http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/content/14/3/276.abstract

James P. Lantolf (1996)
SLA Theory Building: “Letting All the Flowers Bloom!”
Language Learning
Volume 46, Issue 4, pages 713-749, December 1996
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-1770.1996.tb01357.x

Abstract
This article presents a postmodernist critical analysis of the SLA theory building-literature as primarily represented in the writings of Beretta, Crookes, Eubank, Gregg, Long, and to some extent Schumann. I argue that there is no foundational reason to grant privileged status to the modernist view of SLA theory these scholars espouse. Scientific theories are metaphorical constructs that are elevated to theoretical status because they are “taken seriously” by their developers. All of which argues against cutting off any would-be SLA theory before it has the opportunity to be taken seriously (i.e., to bloom).
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-1770.1996.tb01357.x/abstract

Kevin R. Gregg
A theory for every occasion: postmodernism and SLA
Second Language Research October 2000 16: 383-399,
doi:10.1177/026765830001600404
http://slr.sagepub.com/content/16/4.toc

Below is "an exception to the pattern of relatively unproductive debate about the nature of SLA" (p. 4)

ALAN FIRTH, JOHANNES WAGNER
On Discourse, Communication, and (Some) Fundamental Concepts in SLA Research
The Modern Language Journal
Volume 81, Issue 3, pages 285-300, Autumn 1997

Abstract
This article argues for a reconceptualization of Second Language Acquisition (SLA) research that would enlarge the ontological and empirical parameters of the field. We claim that methodologies, theories, and foci within SLA reflect an imbalance between cognitive and mentalistic orientations, and social and contextual orientations to language, the former orientation being unquestionably in the ascendancy. This has resulted in a skewed perspective on discourse and communication, which conceives of the foreign language speaker as a deficient communicator struggling to overcome an underdeveloped L2 competence, striving to reach the “target” competence of an idealized native speaker (NS). We contend that SLA research requires a significantly enhanced awareness of the contextual and interactional dimensions of language use, an increased “emic” (i.e., participant-relevant) sensitivity towards fundamental concepts, and the broadening of the traditional SLA data base. With such changes in place, the field of SLA has the capacity to become a theoretically and methodologically richer, more robust enterprise, better able to explicate the processes of second or foreign language (S/FL) acquisition, and better situated to engage with and contribute to research commonly perceived to reside outside its boundaries.
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-4781.1997.tb05480.x/abstract

Ten years later after the publication of the above article, MLJ published a special issue.

The Modern Language Journal
December 2007
Volume 91, Issue Supplement s1
Pages 733-942
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/modl.2007.91.issue-s1/issuetoc

Among the papers in the issue is one by Firth and Wagner.

ALAN FIRTH, JOHANNES WAGNER
Second/Foreign Language Learning as a Social Accomplishment: Elaborations on a Reconceptualized SLA
The Modern Language Journal
Volume 91, Issue Supplement s1, pages 800-819, December 2007

Abstract
In this article, we begin by delineating the background to and motivations behind Firth and Wagner (1997), wherein we called for a reconceptualization of second language acquisition (SLA) research. We then outline and comment upon some of our critics' reactions to the article. Next we review and discuss the conceptual, theoretical, and methodological impact the article has had on the SLA field. Thereafter, we reengage and develop some of the themes raised but left undeveloped in the 1997 article. These themes cluster around the notions of and interrelationships between language use, language learning, and language acquisition. Although we devote space to forwarding the position that the dichotomy of language use and acquisition cannot defensibly be maintained (and in this we take up a contrary position to that held in mainstream SLA), our treatment of the issues is essentially methodological. We focus on describing a variety of aspects of learning-in-action, captured in transcripts of recordings of naturally occurring foreign, second, or other language interactions. Through transcript analyses, we explore the possibilities of describing learning-in-action devoid of cognitivistic notions of language and learning. In so doing, we advance moves to formulate and establish a reconceptualized SLA.
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-4781.2007.00670.x/abstract

For my summary of Firth and Wagner's papers, go to

http://yosukeyanase.blogspot.jp/2012/04/three-mlj-articles-by-firth-and-wagner.html




Chapter 2: A short history of second language acquisition


2.1 INTRODUCTION

The Input-Interaction-Output (IIO) model and other models that are not treated in this book (Non-English publications and researches whose starting and ending points are Universal Grammar). p. 9



2.2 FOUNDATIONS

SLA since the late 1960s (Long 1998) or the 1940s?



2.3 PROGRAMMATIC AHISTORICITY?

Margaret Thomas
PROGRAMMATIC AHISTORICITY IN SECOND LANGUAGE ACQUISITION THEORY
Studies in Second Language Acquisition (1998), 20 : pp 387-405
1998 Cambridge University Press

Abstract
Second language acquisition theory conventionally represents itself as having been invented ex nihilo in the last decades of the twentieth century. This article investigates the nature of this largely unexamined disciplinary self-concept and questions its validity. I dispute arguments that might be formulated to support the notion that SLA theory has no relevant earlier history, enumerate some of the unfortunate consequences of maintaining this belief, and speculate about benefits to the field that might accrue from abandoning it. Instead of presenting SLA theory as having its origin in the last 20 or 30 years, I suggest that we need to look for ways to identify, investigate, and eventually reconceptualize its true history.
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=36503&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0272263198003040

2.4 BEGINNINGS

The 1940s and 1950s: (1) Interest in foreign language teaching and learning during and after World War II; (2) American structralist linguistics; (3) Behaviourism.

Charles Fries (1945)
Teaching and Learning English as a Foreign Language.
University of Michigan Press

Abstract
This volume sets forth in a nontechnical manner the linguistic approach employed in writing instructional materials used in English-as-a-second-language programs at the English Language Institute of the University of Michigan during the 1940's and 1950's. Each section of this volume presents the principles or the assumptions underlying the choice, sequence, and handling of the materials of the "Intensive Course in English for Latin-American Students." Chapters include: (1) "On Learning a Foreign Language as an Adult," (2) "The Sounds: Understanding and Producing the 'Stream of Speech'," (3) "The Structure: Making Automatic the Use of the Devices of Arrangement and Form," (4) "The Words: Mastering Vocabulary Content," and (5) "Contextual Orientation." Appendixes contain"Step-by-Step Procedure in Marking Limited Intonation,""Lessons in Pronunciation, Structure, and Vocabulary from 'Ingles por Practica'," and "Outline of Materials of 'An Intensive Course in English for Latin Americans'." (RL)
http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/search/detailmini.jsp?_nfpb=true&_&ERICExtSearch_SearchValue_0=ED071477&ERICExtSearch_SearchType_0=no&accno=ED071477

Uriel Weinreich's Language in contact (1953) and "transfer" and "interference". (Wikipedia: Language transfer)

Robert Lado's Linguistics across cultures (1957) and behaviourist psychology and contrastive analysis. (Wikipedia: Contrastive analysis)

B.F. Skinner and "operant conditioning" as the modification of "voluntary behavior", different from "classical conditioning". His book Verbal Behavior was the benchmark.


Chomsky's "A Review of B. F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior" in Language, 35, No. 1 (1959), 26-58."

Below is the review with preface added in 1967.

I had intended this review not specifically as a criticism of Skinner's speculations regarding language, but rather as a more general critique of behaviorist (I would now prefer to say "empiricist") speculation as to the nature of higher mental processes. My reason for discussing Skinner's book in such detail was that it was the most careful and thoroughgoing presentation of such speculations, an evaluation that I feel is still accurate. Therefore, if the conclusions I attempted to substantiate in the review are correct, as I believe they are, then Skinner's work can be regarded as, in effect, a reductio ad absurdum of behaviorist assumptions. My personal view is that it is a definite merit, not a defect, of Skinner's work that it can be used for this purpose, and it was for this reason that I tried to deal with it fairly exhaustively. I do not see how his proposals can be improved upon, aside from occasional details and oversights, within the framework of the general assumptions that he accepts. I do not, in other words, see any way in which his proposals can be substantially improved within the general framework of behaviorist or neobehaviorist, or, more generally, empiricist ideas that has dominated much of modern linguistics, psychology, and philosophy. The conclusion that I hoped to establish in the review, by discussing these speculations in their most explicit and detailed form, was that the general point of view was largely mythology, and that its widespread acceptance is not the result of empirical support, persuasive reasoning, or the absence of a plausible alternative.
http://www.chomsky.info/articles/1967----.htm

George Miller's "The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two" (1956)

George Miller
The cognitive revolution: a historical perspective
Volume 7, Issue 3, March 2003, Pages 141-144
Trends in Cognitive Sciences


The cognitive revolution in psychology was a counter-revolution. The first revolution occurred much earlier when a group of experimental psychologists, influenced by Pavlov and other physiologists, proposed to redefine psychology as the science of behavior. They argued that mental events are not publicly observable. The only objective evidence available is, and must be, behavioral. By changing the subject to the study of behavior, psychology could become an objective science based on scientific laws of behavior.

The behavioral revolution transformed experimental psychology in the US. Perception became discrimination, memory became learning, language became verbal behavior, intelligence became what intelligence tests test. By the time I went to graduate school at Harvard in the early 1940s the transformation was complete. I was educated to study behavior and I learned to translate my ideas into the new jargon of behaviorism. As I was most interested in speech and hearing, the translation sometimes became tricky. But one's reputation as a scientist could depend on how well the trick was played.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00029-9

2.5 THE 1960s AND 1970s

2.5.1 Interlanguage

S.P. Corder (1967)
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LEARNER'S ERRORS.
International Review of Applied Linguistics, 5: 161-9.

Abstract
ERRORS (NOT MISTAKES) MADE IN BOTH SECOND LANGUAGE LEARNING AND CHILD LANGUAGE ACQUISITION PROVIDE EVIDENCE THAT A LEARNER USES A DEFINITE SYSTEM OF LANGUAGE AT EVERY POINT IN HIS DEVELOPMENT. THIS SYSTEM, OR "BUILT-IN SYLLABUS," MAY YIELD A MORE EFFICIENT SEQUENCE THAN THE INSTRUCTOR-GENERATED SEQUENCE BECAUSE IT IS MORE MEANINGFUL TO THE LEARNER. BY ALLOWING THE LEARNER'S INNATE STRATEGIES TO DICTATE THE LANGUAGE SYLLABUS, RATHER THAN IMPOSING UPON HIM PRECONCEIVED NOTIONS OF WHAT HE OUGHT TO LEARN, A MORE EFFECTIVE MEANS OF LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION MAY BE ACHIEVED. THIS ARTICLE APPEARED IN THE "INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS IN LANGUAGE TEACHING," VOLUME 5, NUMBER 4, NOVEMBER 1967, PAGES 161-170. (AF)
http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/search/detailmini.jsp?_nfpb=true&_&ERICExtSearch_SearchValue_0=ED019903&ERICExtSearch_SearchType_0=no&accno=ED019903

Corder introduced the notions of 'inbuildt syllabus', 'transitional competence', 'idiolect' and the distinction between 'input' and 'intake' and the one between 'error' and 'mistake'.

Selinker later coined the term 'interlanguage'.



2.5.2 Creative construction

Heidi C. Dulay, Marina K. Burt
SHOULD WE TEACH CHILDREN SYNTAX?
Language Learning
Volume 23, Issue 2, pages 245-258, December 1973

Abstract
Two research studies on child L2 acquisition were conducted sequentially over the last year. The first study used comparative error analysis to determine whether the actual L2 errors children make can be accounted for by “creative construction” or “habit formation.” The findings provided the impetus for the second study which compared the sequence of acquisition of certain grammatical morphemes in three different groups of children, using a cross-sectional technique. The combined findings of the two studies suggest that, given a natural communication situation, children's innate ability to organize structure accounts in a major way for their acquisition of L2 syntax. Although we believe that an L2 teacher should continue to diagnose children's L2 speech, our findings suggest that we should leave the learning of syntax to the children and redirect our teaching efforts. Practical suggestions are offered to help create speech environments in the classroom that capitalize on the child's natural language learning processes.
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-1770.1973.tb00659.x/abstract

Stephen D. Krashen
Formal and Informal Linguistic Environments in Language Acquisition and Language Learning
TESOL Quarterly
Vol. 10, No. 2 (Jun., 1976) (pp. 157-168)

Abstract
While some studies indicate that adults can efficiently utilize informal linguistic environments for second language acquisition, other studies suggest that the classroom is of greater benefit. This conflict is resolved in three ways. Evidence is presented to support the hypothesis that informal and formal environments contribute to different aspects of second language competence, the former affecting acquired competence and the latter affecting learned competence. Second, a distinction must be made between informal environments in which active language use occurs regularly and those in which language use is irregular. Finally, data is presented that suggests that the classroom can be used simultaneously as a formal and informal linguistic environment, a result that is consistent with reports of success with language teaching systems that emphasize active language use.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/info/3585637

The following books by Krashen are now publicly available.

Krashen, S.D. (1981).
Second Language Acquisition and Second Language Learning.
Oxford: Pergamon.
http://www.sdkrashen.com/SL_Acquisition_and_Learning/SL_Acquisition_and_Learning.pdf


Krashen, S.D. (1982).
Principles and Practice in Second Language Acquisition.
Oxford: Pergamon.
http://www.sdkrashen.com/Principles_and_Practice/Principles_and_Practice.pdf

Wikipedia: Input Hypothesis

Controlled and automatic human information processing: I. Detection, search, and attention.
Schneider, Walter; Shiffrin, Richard M.
Psychological Review, Vol 84(1), Jan 1977, 1-66.
doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.84.1.1

Abstract
A 2-process theory of human information processing is proposed and applied to detection, search, and attention phenomena. Automatic processing is activation of a learned sequence of elements in long-term memory that is initiated by appropriate inputs and then proceeds automatically--without S control, without stressing the capacity limitations of the system, and without necessarily demanding attention. Controlled processing is a temporary activation of a sequence of elements that can be set up quickly and easily but requires attention, is capacity-limited (usually serial in nature), and is controlled by the S. A series of studies, with approximately 8 Ss, using both reaction time and accuracy measures is presented, which traces these concepts in the form of automatic detection and controlled search through the areas of detection, search, and attention. Results in these areas are shown to arise from common mechanisms. Automatic detection is shown to develop following consistent mapping of stimuli to responses over trials. Controlled search was utilized in varied-mapping paradigms, and in the present studies, it took the form of serial, terminating search.
http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/rev/84/1/1/

Controlled and automatic human information processing: II. Perceptual learning, automatic attending and a general theory.
Shiffrin, Richard M.; Schneider, Walter
Psychological Review, Vol 84(2), Mar 1977, 127-190.
doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.84.2.127

Abstract
Tested the 2-process theory of detection, search, and attention presented by the current authors (1977) in a series of experiments. The studies (a) demonstrate the qualitative difference between 2 modes of information processing: automatic detection and controlled search; (b) trace the course of the learning of automatic detection, of categories, and of automatic-attention responses; and (c) show the dependence of automatic detection on attending responses and demonstrate how such responses interrupt controlled processing and interfere with the focusing of attention. The learning of categories is shown to improve controlled search performance. A general framework for human information processing is proposed. The framework emphasizes the roles of automatic and controlled processing. The theory is compared to and contrasted with extant models of search and attention.
http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/rev/84/2/127/

Block states:

Stated succinctly, these researchers and just about anyone calling him/herself a cognitive psychologist at the time, took as axiomatic that learing proceeded from conscious, attention-focused activity to subconscious, automatic processing. (p. 20)

2.6 THE 1980s AND ONWARDS

Assessment Strategies for Second Language Acquisition Theories
MICHAEL H. LONG
Applied Linguistics (1993) 14 (3): 225-249.
doi: 10.1093/applin/14.3.225

Abstract
There are numerous theories of second language acquisition (SLA), many of them oppositional. Whether or not this is inevitable now, culling will eventually be necessary if researchers are to meet their social responsibilities or if SLA is to be explained and a stage of normal science achieved. For the culling to be principled, a rational approach to theory assessment is needed, and the difficulty of identifying universally valid evaluation criteria makes this problematic. Assessment strategies used in other fields can be useful in SLA, but choice among them will depend on the researcher's (implicit or explicit) philosophy of science.
http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/content/14/3/225.abstract

2.7 THE INPUT-INTERACTION-OUTPUT (IIO) MODEL


See Figure 2.1 on p. 28 and explain the IIO model.






(to be continued)