Summary
of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft)
Introduction
Below
is my summary of Kant’s Critique of Pure
Reason. Needless to say, it is not
meant to cover the whole argument of the book, but is only a mere attempt to
understand some of the arguments in it to clarify the issues of my concern,
such as I, identity, or communicative
competence as an ability attributed
to the individual.
Following
the gist that I’ll immediately offer, this article provides sections of (1) key terms, (2) transcendental ideas, (3)
‘I’ as the transcendental subject of thoughts = X, (4) freedom, and (5) principle
of pure reason.
Some note
on terminology: Kant uses non-technical words (eg. intuition, appearance, idea,
etc) in his own systematic way. In order
to emphasize his systematic terminology (and to avoid understanding his terms
according to our ordinary usage), I capitalize the first letter of such terms
or hyphenizes phrases. I also provide
the original German words and texts where I deem it necessary and appropriate
to do so. Numbers presented in the
parentheses following the quotation (eg., (49), (B19)) indicates the page
number of either Penguin translation or the second edition of the original text
(the number with B).
Gist of Critique of Pure Reason
Kant
distinguishes three stages in human cognition: Sensibility, Understanding and Reason. Through these stages of cognition, humans
experience the world as Appearance, distinct from Thing-in-itself, which is
beyond our cognition (or indeed any cognitions). Objects are given in Appearance and it is
Sensibility that receives them as Intuitions. Intuitions
are united into Concepts in Understanding.
By means of Concepts, humans understand the world of Appearance, and
Concepts are to based on the reception of Intuitions from
Objects. Some Concepts are developed into
Pure Concept by Reason, though. Pure
Concepts, that are called Ideas, are not based on Intuitions and Objects, and therefore are unconditioned. These Ideas produce
notions such as I, Freedom, or God. While Ideas are not
specific or individualized, Ideals which are also products of Reason are
conceived in the embodied image. Both
Ideas and Ideals are produced by Reason, and it is the task of Reason to deal
with them properly. It is this task that
Kant explores in Critique of Pure Reason.
1 Key terms
1.1 About
Transcendentalism
Knowledge
(Erkenntnis):
As
Kant tried to integrate British empiricism and continental rationalism, his
notion of knowledge is based both on empiricism
(in the sense of a posteriori – from
experience) and rationalism (in the sense that it calls for the notion of a priori – prior to or independent of
any experience).
But
although all our knowledge begins with
experience, it does not follow that it arises from experience. (37)
Wenn aber gleich alle unsere Erkenntnis mit der Erfahrung anhebt, so entspringt sie darum doch nicht eben
alle aus der Erfahrung. (B1)
Synthetic judgment
a priori (synthethische Urteile a priori):
Knowledge or judgment can be a priori without any problem if it is analytic – when the truth is
contained in the very words to express it.
Kant argues that judgment apriori can also be synthetic –the opposite
notion of analytic— by citing pure mathematics, pure science (eg., permanence
of the quantity of matter, inertia, equality of action and reaction, etc (50, B21))
and metaphysics. Indeed, the problem of
pure reason is about this synthetic judgment a priori.
Now
the real problem of pure reason is contained in the question: How are synthetic judgements a priori possible?
(49)
Die eigentliche Aufgabe der reinen Vernunft ist nun in der Frage
enthalten: Wie sind synthetische Urteile
a priori möglich? (B19)
Transcendental
philosophy (Transzendental-Philosophie):
So, Kant’s philosophy is both in and beyond
experience. Unlike some extreme
believers of idealism, he acknowledges objects in the world, but he is more
interested in understanding how we know objects in a way we take it just for
granted (a priori). Kant’s philosophy
is transcendental; it explores the conditions of human knowledge that contain a priori elements.
I
call all knowledge transcendental
which deals not so much with objects as with our manner of knowing objects
insofar as this manner is to be possible a
priori. A system of such concepts
would be called transcendental philosophy. (52)
Ich nenne alle Erkenntnis transzendental, die sich nicht sowohl
mit Gegenständen, sondern mit unserer
Erkenntnisart von Gegenständen, insofern diese a priori möglich sein soll,
überhaupt beschäftigt. Ein System solcher Begriffe würde Transzendental-Philosophie
heißen. (B25)
Transcendental
in our cognition are Sensibility, Understanding, and Reason, among others. Let’s further see what they mean below.
1.2 About
Sensibility
Sensibility
(Sinnlichkeit) and Intuition (Anschauung)
Kant
posits Sensibility (Sinnlichkeit) as the first stage of human cognition. The source of our knowledge is ultimately
objects in the world of Appearance (not Things-in-themselves), and objects are
received by Sensibility in representations called Intuitions (Anschauung –eine
bestimmte Meinung od. Ansicht über etwas; das, was man sich unter einer Sache
vorstellt, was man unter ihr verstehtl— can also be translated as Views).
The
capacity (receptivity) to obtain representations through the way in which we
are affected is called sensibility. Objects are therefore given to us by means of our sensibility. Sensibility alone supplies us with intuitions. (59)
Die Fähigkeit (Rezeptivität), Vorstellungen durch die Art, wie wir
von Gegenständen affiziert werden, zu bekommen, heißt Sinnlichkeit. Vermittelst der Sinnlichkeit also werden uns
Gegenstände gegeben, und sie allein
liefert uns Anschauungen (B33)
Space (Raum) and
time (Zeit) as pure intuitions
Whereas
most intuitions are obtained from experience (a posteriori), some are pure and a priori. They are space and
time, which constitute Form (in the Aristotelian sense) in general in which empirical
intuitions a posteriori are realized as Matter (the Aristotelian sense, too).
Space
and time are its pure forms while sensation in general is its matter. The forms of space and time alone we can know
a priori, that is, prior to all
actual perception, and such knowledge is therefore called pure intuition. (75)
Raum und Zeit sind die reinen Formen derselben, Empfindung
überhaupt die Materie. Jene können wir allein a priori, d.i. vor aller
wirklichen Wahrnehmung erkennen, und sie heißt darum reine Anschauung (B60)
1.3 About Understanding
Understanding
(Verstand) and Concept (Begriff)
From
Intuitions in Sensibility, Understanding as the second stage of cognition
spontaneously produces Concepts in our thought.
These
intuitions are thought through the
understanding, and from the understanding there arise concepts. (59)
durch
den Verstand aber werden sie [=Anschauunngen] gedacht, und von ihm entspringen Begriffe. (B33)
NB. This quotation immediately follows the
quotation of 59/B33 in the previous section.
Pure Concept of
Understanding (reine Verstandesbegriff)
Just
like Intuitions have pure ones, Concepts have pure ones (Pure Concept of
Understanding) and its function is to produce unity in various representations
in an Intuition. (Note: I do not yet
have a good understanding of the role of the term representation (Vorstellung)
in Kantian philosophy).
The
same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgement likewise gives unity to
the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition; and this unity may in a general way be called the
pure concept of the understanding. The
same understanding - and through the same operations by which it produced, in
concepts, the logical form of a judgement by means of analytic unity - also
introduces a transcendental content into its representations, by means of the
synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general. These representations are therefore pure
concepts of the understanding applying a
priori to objects - a content which cannot be introduced by general
logic. (104-105)
Dieselbe
Funktion, welche den verschiedenen Vorstellungen in einem Urteile Einheit gibt,
die gibt auch der bloßen Synthesis verschiedene Vorstellungen in einer
Anschauung Einheit, welche, allgemein ausgedrückt, der reine Verstandesbegriff
heißt. Derselbe Verstand also, und zwar durch eben dieselben Handlungen,
wodurch er in Begriffen, vermittelst der analytischen Einheit, die logische
Form eines Urteils zustande brachte, bringt auch, vermittelst der synthetischen
Einheit des Mannigfaltigen in der Anschauung überhaupt, in seine Vorstellungen
einen transzendentalen Inhalt, weswegen sie reine Verstandesbegriffe heißen,
die a priori auf Objekte gehen, welches die allgemeine Logik nicht leisten
kann. (B104-105)
Both
Sensibility and Understanding are essential elements of our cognition and
either is better or worse than the other.
We call
sensibility the receptivity of our mind to receive representations insofar as it is
in some wise affected, while the understanding,
on the other hand, is our faculty of producing representations by ourselves, or
the spontaneity of knowledge. We are so constituted that our intuition can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only the
mode in which we are affected by objects.
The faculty, on the contrary, which enables us to think the object of
sensible intuition is the understanding. Neither of these properties is to be
preferred to the other. Without
sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object
would be thought. Thoughts without content
are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. (86)
Wollen
wir die Rezeptivität unseres Gemüts,
Vorstellungen zu empfangen, sofern es auf irgendeine Weise affiziert wird, Sinnlichkeit nennen, so ist dagegen das
Vermögen, Vorstellungen selbst hervorzubringen, oder die Spontaneität des
Erkenntnisses, der Verstand. Unsere Natur
bringt es so mit sich, daß die Anschauung
niemals anders als sinnlich sein
kann, d.i. nur die Art enthält, wie wir von Gegenständen affiziert werden.
Dagegen ist das Vermögen, den Gegenstand sinnlicher Anschauung zu denken, der Verstand. Keine dieser Eigenschaften ist der anderen vorzuziehen.
Ohne Sinnlichkeit würde uns kein Gegenstand gegeben, und ohne Verstand keiner
gedacht werden. Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind
blind. (B76)
Sensibility
receives objects and obtains Intuitions, and Understanding spontaneously
produces Concepts in our thought.
Concepts
are based, therefore, on the spontaneity of thought, sensible intuitions on the
receptivity of impressions. (97, B93)
Begriffe
gründen sich also auf der Spontaneität des Denkens, wie sinnliche Anschauungen
auf der Rezeptivität der Eindrücke. (B93)
1.4 About Reason
(Vernunft)
Reason
(Vernunft)
Reason
is the third and the last stage of our cognition. Reason produces the highest
unity of cognitions in our thought produced by Understanding (just like Understanding
produces the unity of Intuitions from Sensibility).
All
our knowledge begins with the senses, proceeds thence to the understanding and
ends with reason. There is nothing
higher in us than reason for working on the material of intuition and bringing
it under the highest unity of thought.
(288)
Alle
unsere Erkenntnis hebt von den Sinnen an, geht von da zum Verstande, und endigt
bei der Vernunft, über welche nichts Höheres in uns angetroffen wird, den Stoff
der Anschauung zu bearbeiten und unter die höchste Einheit des Denkens zu
bringen. (B355)
When
Reason produces unity to Concepts in thought, it is not directly connected to
Intuitions in Sensibility or objects in the world of Appearance. It only deals with Concepts in Understanding
and brings unity that is kept apart from empirical experience; the unity that
Reason brings is a priori.
If
the understanding is a faculty for producing unity of appearances according to
rules, then reason is the faculty for producing unity of the rules of the
understanding under principles. Reason,
therefore, at first never looks directly to experience, nor to any object, but
to the understanding in order to impart to its manifold kinds of knowledge an a priori unity of reason and which is
very different from the unity which can be produced by understanding. (291)
Der
Verstand mag ein Vermögen der Einheit der Erscheinungen vermittelst der Regeln
sein, so ist die Vernunft das Vermögen der Einheit der Verstandesregeln unter Prinzipien.
So geht also niemals zunächst auf Erfahrung, oder auf irgendeinen Gegenstand,
sondern auf den Verstand, um den mannigfaltigen Erkenntnissen desselben Einheit
a priori durch Begriffe zu geben, welche Vernunfteinheit heißen mag, und von
ganz anderer Art ist, als sie von dem Verstande geleistet werden kann. (B359)
Idea (Idee)
Pure
concept, also known as notion (Notio), is still in the stage of Understanding
along with empirical concepts, although concepts, both empirical and pure, are
already beyond the stage of Sensibility.
Pure concepts can, however, go beyond the realm of experience and thus
become concepts of reason called Ideas (Ideen).
A
concept is either an empirical or a pure concept; and the pure concept,
insofar as it has its origin solely in the understanding (not in the pure image
of sensibility) is called notion. A concept formed of notions and transcending
the possibility of experience is an idea,
or concept of reason. (302)
Der
Begriff ist entweder ein empirischer oder reiner Begriff, und der reine
Begriff, sofern er lediglich im Verstande seinen Ursprung hat (nicht im reinen
Bilde der Sinnlichkeit) heißt Notio. Ein Begriff aus Notionen, der die
Möglichkeit der Erfahrung übersteigt, ist die Idee, oder der Vernunftbegriff. (B377)
Idea is transcendental
and does not refer to any object in the world.
As
Ideas work in Reason, which is kept apart from Sensibility in our empirical
world, they are not conditioned by any reality, or, to put it the other way,
are conditioned by the totality of all possible conditions; They are
transcendent (and also transcendental) and refer to no objects in the empirical
world. In this sense, they are used in Pure
Reason in its operation, and should not necessarily be degraded as mere
fancies.
By
idea I understand a necessary concept of reason to which the senses can supply
no congruent object. The concepts of
reason, therefore, of which we have been speaking, are transcendental ideas. They
are concepts of pure reason insofar as they consider all empirical knowledge as
determined by an absolute totality of conditions. They are not mere fancies, but are imposed by
the very nature of reason itself, and therefore refer by necessity to the whole
use of the understanding. They are,
lastly, transcendent and overstep the limits of all experience; no object can
ever be given in experience that would be adequate to the transcendental
idea. (306-307)
Ich
verstehe unter der Idee einen notwendigen Vernunftbegriff, dem kein
kongruierender Gegenstand in den Sinnen gegeben werden kann. Also sind unsere
jetzt erwogenen reinen Vernunftbegriffe transzendentale
Ideen. Sie sind Begriffe der reinen Vernunft; denn sie betrachten alles
Erfahrungserkenntnis als bestimmt durch eine absolute Totalität der
Bedingungen. Sie sind nicht willkürlich erdichtet, sondern durch die Natur der
Vernunft selbst aufgegeben, und beziehen sich daher notwendigerweise auf den
ganzen Verstandesgebrauch. Sie sind endlich transzendent und übersteigen die
Grenze aller Erfahrung, in welcher also niemals ein Gegenstand vorkommen kann,
der der transzendentalen Idee adäquat wäre.
(B383-384)
Reason
“orders” concepts of Understanding to bring the ultimate unity. In the process of obtaining the ultimate
unity (which is not actually obtainable), Reason extends the limits of Concepts
of Understanding that is inherited from the empirical world of
Sensibility. It is part of the nature of
Reason to try to obtain unconditionally complete, something that can be
thought, but not available in our experience.
Reason
never refers directly to an object, but only to the understanding, and through
the latter to its own empirical use. It
does not, therefore, create concepts
(of objects), but only orders them,
and imparts to them that unity which they can have in their greatest possible
extension, that is, with reference to the totality of different series; while
the understanding does not concern itself with this totality, but only with the
connection whereby series of
conditions everywhere come into being
according to concepts. Reason actually
has, therefore, as its object only the understanding and its purposive use; and
just as the understanding unites the manifold in the object by means of
concepts, so reason unites the manifold of concepts by means of ideas, making a
certain collective unity the aim of the acts of the understanding, which
otherwise are concerned only with distributive unity. (532-533)
Die
Vernunft bezieht sich niemals geradezu auf einen Gegenstand, sondern lediglich
auf den Verstand, und vermittelst desselben auf ihren eigenen empirischen
Gebrauch, schafft also keine
Begriffe (von Objekten), sondern ordnet
sie nur, und gibt ihnen diejenige Einheit, welche sie in ihrer größtmöglichen
Ausbreitung haben können, d.i. in Beziehung auf die Totalität der Reihen, als
auf welche der Verstand gar nicht sieht, sondern nur auf diejenige Verknüpfung,
dadurch allerwärts Reihen der Bedingungen nach Begriffen zustande kommen. Die
Vernunft hat also eigentlich nur den Verstand und dessen zweckmäßige Anstellung
zum Gegenstande, und, wie dieser das Mannigfaltige im Objekt durch Begriffe
vereinigt, so vereinigt jene ihrerseits das Mannigfaltige der Begriffe durch
Ideen, indem sie eine gewisse kollektive Einheit zum Ziele der
Verstandeshandlungen setzt, welche sonst nur mit der distributiven Einheit
beschäftigt sind. (B671-672)
Transcendental
concepts of reasons are what drive Reason to its ultimate of direction: the
absolute totality that unconditioned in any way.
Now,
the transcendental concept of reason always aims at the absolute totality in
the synthesis of conditions, and does not end until it has reached that which
is unconditioned absolutely, that is, in any relation. (306)
Nun
geht der transzendentale Vernunftbegriff jederzeit nur auf die absolute Totalität
in der Synthesis der Bedingungen, und endigt niemals, als bei den schlechthin,
d.i. in jeder Beziehung, Unbedingten. (B383)
Ideal (Ideal)
An
interesting derivation from Ideas (Ideen) is the Ideal (Ideal), which unlike
Ideas has a specific image of the individual.
It is interesting because it looks like a specific object but has no
object in the empirical world.
Still
further removed from objective reality than the idea would seem to be what I
call the ideal, by which I mean the
idea, not only in concreto but in individuo, that is, an individual
thing determinable or even determined by the idea alone. (485)
Aber
noch weiter, als die Idee, scheint dasjenige von der objektiven Realität
entfernt zu sein, was ich das Ideal nenne, und worunter ich die Idee, nicht
bloß in concreto, sondern in individuo, d.i. als ein einzelnes, durch die Idee
allein bestimmbares, oder gar bestimmtes Ding, verstehe. (B596)
Ideal
is the idea of a divine understanding according to Plato. We are only a few steps away from God, the
topic I have to omit in this article.
What
to us is an ideal, was in Plato's
language an idea of a divine
understanding, an individual object of its pure intuition, the most perfect
of every kind of possible being, and the archetype of all copies in
appearance. (486)
Was uns ein Ideal ist, war dem Plato eine Idee des göttlichen
Verstandes, ein einzelner Gegenstand in der reinen Anschauung desselben, das
Vollkommenste einer jeden Art möglicher Wesen und der Urgrund aller Nachbilder
in der Erscheinung. (B597)
Below
is the summary figure of Sensibility, Understanding and Reason. (For the explanation of Illusion (Schein),
please read the following chapter).
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