Thursday, April 5, 2012

Atkinson (2010) Extended, Embodied Cognition and Second Language Acquisition





EXTENDED COGNITION AND EMBODIED COGNITION


Atkinson's paper in 2010 is a very informative introduction to the ideas of extended cognition (see externalism) and embodied cogniton for applied linguists and one of the pioneer studies of SLA, which currently is categorized (perhaps too humbly) as one of the "alternative" approaches.


Dwight Atkinson
Extended, Embodied Cognition and Second Language Acquisition
Applied Linguistics (2010) 31 (5): 599-622.
doi: 10.1093/applin/amq009
http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/content/31/5/599.abstract?sid=5bae0332-fb94-4ea4-9464-fca295e66d99




ABSTRACT
A cognitivist approach to cognition has traditionally dominated second language acquisition (SLA) studies. In this article, I examine two alternative approaches - extended cognition and embodied cognition - for how they might help us conceptualize SLA. More specifically, I present: (i) summaries of extended and embodied cognition, followed by reasons why the two can be treated as a single, synthetic perspective; (ii) an approach to SLA grounded in an extended, embodied view of cognition - i.e. a sociocognitive approach - in three principles; and (iii) a naturally occurring example of extended, embodied cognition-for-SLA.http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/content/31/5/599.abstract?sid=5bae0332-fb94-4ea4-9464-fca295e66d99




Atkinson regards extended cognition and embodied cognition as mutually related "because bodies link minds to the world -- we experience, understand, and act on the world through the bodies." (Atkinson, 2010 p. 1). These two perspectives, which have entered the cognitive science mainstream, are synthesized and constitute what he calls a sociocognitive approach.

In introducing extended cognition and embodied cognition, Atkinson calls our attention to seminal papers such as Clark and Chalmers (1998) and Barsalou (2008).


Below is the introduction of Clark and Chalmers (1998). (You can also use Google Scholar).


Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question invites two standard replies. Some accept the boundaries of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body is outside the mind. Others are impressed by arguments suggesting that the meaning of our words 'just ain't in the head', and hold that this externalism about meaning carries over into an externalism abou mind. We propose to pursue a third position. We advocate a very different sort of externalism: an active externalism, based on the active role of the environment in driving cognitive processes.



And here is the abstract of Barsalou (2008).

Grounded cognition rejects traditional views that cognition is computation on amodal symbols in a modular system, independent of the brain's modal systems for perception, action, and introspection. Instead, grounded cognition proposes that modal simulations, bodily states, and situated action underlie cognition. Accumulating behavioral and neural evidence supporting this view is reviewed from research on perception, memory, knowledge, language, thought, social cognition, and development. Theories of grounded cognition are also reviewed, as are origins of the area and common misperceptions of it. Theoretical, empirical, and methodological issues are raised whose future treatment is likely to affect the growth and impact of grounded cognition.





SOCIOCOGNITIVE APPROACH TO SLA

The next section of Atkinson's paper is his sociocognitive exploration into SLA. At the beginning of the section he states:


Extended, embodied perspectives on cognition have entered the cognitive science mainstream, but are just beginning to influence SLA studies. I try to promote their development here, working within a sociocognitive approach to SLA (Atkinson 2002; Atkinson et al. 2007; Churchill et al. 2010). Specifically, I introduce three SLA principles based on extended, embodied cognition: (1) The Inseparability Principle: Mind, body, and world work together in learning/ SLA; (2) The Learning-is-adaptive Principle: Learning/SLA facilitates survival and prosperity in complex environments; and (3) The Alignment Principle: A major engine of learning/SLA is alignment -- the means by which we effect interaction.


Let's see more about what Atkinson says regarding the three principles and their implications for SLA.



(1) The Inseparability Principle and SLA

This section is very persuasive with four versions of the same picture and readers will be entertained by the way Atkinson argues for the inseparability of the mind-body-world. Regarding learning, he argues that the inseparability principle suggests that:


(i) Learning is more discovering how to align with the world than extracting knowledge from it (Ingold 2000); and (ii) By being environmentally embedded, knowledge/cognition is made public and thereby learnable (Goodwin 2003).


These are indeed very good suggestions to classroom researchers (reflective teachers of course included) for observing learners, although many learners in formal school settings are deprived of affordances that the real world or the authentic learning environment offers. It may be imperative for teachers to take a second look at the classroom and re-design it so that learners' minds can better be coordinated with their bodies and worlds. Teaching goes beyond the teacher and is extended into the time-space of the classroom.



(2) The Learning-is-adaptive principle and SLA

This principle, according to Atkinson (2010, p. 611), has four implications: (1) Learning/SLA is relational [to the environment/social practices]; (2) Learning/SLA is experiential, participatory, and guided; (3) Lerning/SLA is public; (4) Learning/SLA is aligning, and learning to align.

Japanese teachrs may easily recall how a very formal, controlled and boring classroom looks like. In there, learners are isolated from each other and what surrounds them. Stone-headed administrators may say "Learners are to just sit silently to study, and no talk or distraction!" [negation of (1)], "Learning must be exactly planned and controlled, and no unexpected events in the class!" [negation of (2)], or "Think how you answer in the entrance examination. All you have is private mind. Learning should take place just in the head!" [negation of (3)].



(3) The alignment principle and SLA

For the definition of alignment, Atkinson quotes one of his earlier works: 'the complex means by which human beings effect coordinated interaction, and maintain that interaction in dynbamically adaptive ways' (Atkinson et al. 2007, p. 169). I should probably read this Atkinson et al. (2007) first and summarize its argument in another post later.



Overall, Atkinson concludes about sociocognitive approach.


Ultimately, sociocognitive approaches to SLA are based on this tripartite premise: (i) Mind, body, and world are in continuous processes of interactive alignment; (ii) These processes are partly public; and (iii) In being public, they are
learnable. Thus, if cognition is the site of learning, it is extended, embodied cognition that makes learning possible, at least in part.


Learning (or at least some part of it) takes place in the alignment of the mind, body and world, and as it is exteded and embodied it is public, that is shared with others. Neural networking within the skull is essential in learning, but that is not the end of the story. Rather the brain activities are the basis of learning, upon which the Mind-in-the-Body-in-the-World interact and align with each other. (After all, Heidegger was right when he used the term In-der-Welt-sein or Being-in-the-World.)

You may say that the implications and suggestions sociocognitive approach offers are just commonsensial and what good teachers know. Maybe. But the important point is that these have been mostly negated by the cognitivism (See Atkinson's Introduction of Alternative Approaches to SLA.)

Cognitivism is still reagarded as the "mainstream" by many in applied linguistics. I wonder whether it should be better regarded as "ancien regime" which should be carefully preserved in the good spirit of conservativism, but not be advanced any longer. For the reflective teacher-researcher, at least, the sociocognitive approach is one of the mainstreams, not one of the 'alternatives'.




REFERENCES

Atkinson, D. 2002. ‘Toward a sociocognitive approach to second language acquisition,’Modern Language Journal 86: 525-45.

Atkinson, D., E. Churchill, T. Nishino, and H. Okada. 2007. ‘Alignment and interaction in a sociocognitive approach to second language acquisition,’ Modern Language Journal 91: 169-88.

Churchill, E., T. Nishino, H. Okada, and D. Atkinson. 2010. ‘Symbiotic gesture and the sociocognitive visibility of grammar,’ Modern Language Journal 94: 2.

Barselou, L. 2008. ‘Grounded cognition,’ Annual Review of Psychology 59: 617-45.

Clark, A. and D. Chalmers. 1998. ‘The extended mind,’ Analysis 58: 7-19.

Goodwin, C. 2003. ‘The body in action’in Coupland J. and R. Gwin (eds): Discourse, the Body, and Identity. Palgrave-MacMillan.

Ingold, T. 2000. Perception of the Environment. Routledge.





Tuesday, April 3, 2012

Leung's "convivial communication", Davidson's passing theory and the norm of ELF




Leung's
"convivial communication" paper



Professor Constant Leung was one of the speakers at the colloquium "Multilingual Turn", one of the most enlightening (and entertaining) events in AAAL 2012 (Boston).

One of his papers that was cited in the colloquium was "Convivial communication: recontextualizing communicative competence", one of the dozens of significant papers in applied linguistics I've been failing to read or even notice. As the colloquium was very interesting, I took an opportunity to read this paper.

Here's bibliographical information of the paper.


Convivial communication: recontextualizing communicative competence

Constant Leung
International Journal of Applied Linguistics
Volume 15, Issue 2, pages 119-144, June 2005

Article first published online: 29 JUN 2005
DOI: 10.1111/j.1473-4192.2005.00084.x
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1473-4192.2005.00084.x/abstract


Here's abstract.


The advent of the concept of communicative competence in English Language Teaching (ELT) over thirty years ago signalled a shift from grammar-based pedagogy to Communicative Language Teaching. It was generally accepted that, in addition to grammar rules, language teaching needed to take account of social context and social rules of use. The concept of communicative competence, initially developed for ethnographic research, appeared to offer an intellectual basis for pedagogic broadening. The transfer of this concept from research to language teaching has, however, produced abstracted contexts and idealized social rules of use based on (English language) native-speakerness. Drawing on recent work in the fields of World Englishes, English as a lingua franca and Second Language Acquisition, this article argues that it is imperative for ELT to take notice of real-world social, cultural and language developments in contemporary conditions and to re-engage with a set of reformulated ethnographic sensitivities and sensibilities.
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1473-4192.2005.00084.x/abstract



The gist of the paper is best expressed in the concluding remark on the last part of the last page.


The objectification and reification of curriculum knowledge largely based on native-speaker idealizations and the reduction of the social to mean classroom interaction have effectively insulated the concept of communicative competence from the developments in English and the myriad ways in which it is now understood and used in different contexts. Theoretically as well as pedagogically, there is every reason to reconnect with the social world if the concept of communicative competence is to mean anything more than a textbook simulacrum of Englishes in the world. (Leung, 2005, p. 139)


The 'objectification and reification' is evident and prevalent in the mainstream of ELT literature, and this was produced by the interpretation and operationalization deemed necessary for the standartized curriculum.


The interpretations and operationalization of the concept of communicative competence over the past thirty years or so, as evidenced by the mainstream of ELT literature, have psychologized and reified the social dimension. (Leung, 2005, p. 138)


However, this is a great deviation from the spirit of Dell Hymes, one of the very first proponents of the concept of communicative competence.


[Ethnography of communication] would approach language neither as an abstracted form nor as an abstract correlate of a community, but as situated in the flux and pattern of communicative events. It would study communicative form and function in integral relation to each other. (Hymes 1994: 12) [Quoted in Leung, 2005, p. 122]

Hymes (1994) Towards ethnographies of communication.
In J. Maybin (ed.), Language and literacy in social practice.
Clevedon: Multilingual Matters,
in association with the Open University. 11-22.




Our task in applied linguistics, then, is to re-define the concept of communicative competence so that the complex realities of the use of English as a lingua franca (ELF) or English as an international language (EIL). Leung states:


Under contemporary conditions, it seems absolutely necessary for the concept of communicative competence to attend to both the standard and local Englishes, and to tune in to both established and emergent forms and norms of use. Through the adoption of different sets of intellectual sensitivities and sensibilities, such as the ones suggested by Roberts et al. (2001), we can begin to de-reify culture-, context- and time-bound notions of linguistic correctness, social and cultural appropriateness, real-life feasibility and possibility in a convivial mood. (Leung, 2005, p. 139)


Roberts, C., M. Byram, A. Barro, S. Jordan and B. Street (2001)
Language learners as ethnographers.
Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.




The task starts with our realization of the nature of idealization of the native speaker model.


Thus, in so far as one may wish to refer to native speakers as a reference point for a specific curriculum, they have to be specified in terms of a whole range of attributes such as social/community position, context and modality of language use, gender, age and so on. So while there are clearly native speakers of English (as there are native speakers of other languages), there isn’t a universal model of native speakers’ use of language. (Leung, 2005, pp. 130)

So there isn’t a unified and bounded phenomenon called English, except in the sense of English being a set of codified lexical and grammatical resources which can be exploited and used for speech and writing or, as Widdowson (2003: 51) calls it, “a virtual language”. (Leung, 2005, pp. 130-131)


Widdowson (2003)
Defining issues in English language teaching.
Oxford University Press.



However, in my opinion, humble gestures from the side of the native speaker is not a solution at all. The statement that the English of the native speaker (whoever it may be) is not the norm may be regarded by some conservative minds as the loss of the objectives in ELT, or hailed by some nationalists as the unconditioned approval of the English they are using (however it is regarded by other speakers of English in the world). I believe we need a better understanding of 'language' and 'norm' in general. For that purpose, I'll present Davidson's theory of language and an idea about the norm of English as a lingua franca.




Davidson's 'passing theory'

Donald Davidson (1917-2003) first caught my attention when Chomsky in New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind (2000) quoted him at some length and then argued that his conclusion was wrong. From experience, I knew that what Chomsky quotes to criticize is worthy of attention.

Of Davidson's works, the following produces one of the most interesting and controversial arguments.


Davidson, D. (2001). 'A nice derangement of epitaphs.'
In A. P. Martinich (Ed.) The philosophy of language.
(pp. 473-483) Oxford: Oxford University Press.


In the paper, Davidson introduces the distinction between prior theory and passing theory. Prior theory is what ordinary people generally regard as a "language": a code system that its native speakers share, more or less, completely, plus some other shared nonlinguistic knowledge -- Davidson uses the term "theory" because "prior theory" is regarded as a systematic method of interpretation that can be used recursively.

Davidson argues that in the case of malapropism, for example, the interpreter understands the speaker's message despite the prior theory; the interpreter disregards the literal meaning of the speaker's malapropism and gets the meaning 'correctly' (that's why the interpreter laughs with understanding). You can extend this argument with cases of understanding new words (those that the interpreter does not know) or 'foreigner's' utterances that greatly deviate from conventional uses of the native speaker. We somehow manage the situation and reach what 'passes' as the interpretation of the intended meaning in communication.

Davidson argues, then, that what is, more or less, shared between the speaker and the interpreter in communication is not the prior theory (or simply a 'language'), but the passing theory -- a tentative method of interpretation of the utterance being processed.


What must be shared for communication to succeed is the passing theory. For the passing theory is the one the interpreter actually uses to interpret an utterance, and it is the theory the speaker intends the interpreter to use. Only if these coincide is understanding complete. (Of course, there are degrees of success in communication; much may be right although something is wrong. This matter of degree is irrelevant to my argument.) (Davidson, 2001, p. 480)



Davidson regards the success of communication not as an entirely linguistic achievement (as the code model suggests), but as a general problem-solving in the real world.


we should realize that we have abandoned not only the ordinary notion of a language, but we have erased the boundary between knowing a language and knowing our way around in the world generally. (Davidson, 2001, p. 482)


Davidson then argues that it is not that we first acquire and share a 'language' completely and then succeed in communication.


We must give up the idea of a clearly defined shared structure which language-users acquire and then apply to cases. (Davidson, 2001, p. 483)


Davidson then says something that may be relevant to language teaching. Teachers may teach a 'language' (a shared code-system) but they are not able to teach how to communicate, at least in a standardized or regularized way, for the passing theory --something you need in the process of communication-- can be so ephemeral and transient to be standardized or regularized.


There is no more chance of regularizing, or teaching, this process than there is of regularizing or teaching the process of creating new theories to cope with new data in any field -- for that is what this process involves. (Davidson, 2001, pp. 482-483)





The norm of English as a lingua franca

Overall, I may concur with Chomsky that Davidson's argument is too radical, but I do believe one of his points has some relevance to linguistics and applied linguistics; a 'language' as a completely shared system of code is not always used in communication. We manage communication with the passing theory, and the use of the passing theory may be a source of language change. Despite, or in the lack of, the prior theory, people utter in different ways and what passes more often than not spread to be established (or not).

When we introduce time-dimension in the study of language (remember that the current standard linguistics is mostly synchronic and disregards the changes along with the passage of time), it becomes difficult for us to see language in a fixed state. Language changes in the passage of time either in microscopic or macroscopic terms. Besides, when a particular 'language' (whatever it may mean) is used by an ever increasing number of users, the changes are amplified. The 'language' becomes more dynamic and complex in its nature.

This is the dilemma of English as a lingua franca; it is hardly stable, so difficult to idealize specifically, so multifaceted, plastic and susceptible to change. How can something so evanescent and diverse be the norm or objective of language education?

My response is to slightly modify the conventional idea of the norm. The norm should not be regarded as a fixed end product, but as an orientation in the processes that learners are to go through. The norm of English as a lingua franca (ELF) is not a product that learners are to have, but a process that learners are to be in. ELF is not a matter of possession but a matter of being in the world.

This kind of process argument is something I've been struggling with (Related post: "Where is Self, and what is it?" No, it's rather "How is Self?": Luhmann's theory of autopoiesis. I wonder if I should read Whitehead's Process and reality (I've never read his works so far).





Friday, March 30, 2012

A three-dimensional understanding of communicative language ability (Integrated version)

[This is an integration of my old posts on "A three-dimensional understanding of communicative language ability". I'm currently thinking of revising this theory.]




September 8, 2007
JACET 46th Annual Convention
in Yasuda Women’s College,
Hiroshima, Japan


JACET symposium

English Education at the Tertiary Level
-- in Search of a Consistent Curriculum from Elementary School through University



Consistency and Diversity
-- A good understanding rather than a good test?--




Yosuke YANASE
Hiroshima University



0 OUTLINE OF TODAY’S PRESENTATION

0.1 BACKGROUND
0.2 RESEARCH QUESTION
0.3 REVIEW
0.4 SOLUTION
0.5 CONCLUSION



1 BACKGROUND

1.1 Concept > Construct > Operational Definition > Measurement


Consistency should NOT mean the dominance of a paper-based standardized test because no paper-based test can capture the whole range of language knowledge and use. (Tests are only educated guesses of hypothetical constructs)

1.2 Understanding involves something immeasurable

Even a General English Proficiency Test may distort our understanding of communicative language ability because it only deals with readily measurable aspects of language and use.
Our understanding of second language communication goes beyond the notion of measurement.


"Oh, so you're not interested in communication, only language." (McNamara, 1996, p. 83)

The dog (our understanding) should wag the tail (a test).

Not the tail wagging the dog.



1.3 Education is more than measurable “objective” and contains immeasurable “aim”


“By objectives I mean the pedagogic intentions of a particular course of study to be achieved within the period of that course and in principle measurable by some assessment device at the end of the course” … “By aims I mean the purposes to which learning will be put after the end of the course.” (Widdowson, 1983, pp.6-7)


1.4 My contention

A good understanding of communicative language ability is more important than a good standardized test.


1.5 Expected results

A good understanding of communicative language ability would bring a good balance between consistency and diversity in curriculum.

Without it, English language education would end in uniformity and conformity, or in complete chaos.

Uniformity and conformity, particularly when harnessed by a standardized test, suppresses creativity and motivation of teachers and students.

Furthermore, neglecting diversity is to deny the different needs of different departments and colleges.




2. RESEARCH QUESTION

What is a good understanding of communicative language ability?

The understanding must be theoretically sound and simple enough to be a guideline for curriculum.


3. REVIEW

3.1 Descriptive approach


Common European Framework of Reference for Languages: Learning, Teaching, Assessment.

Cliche:
“Professor, your talk is too abstract and too general. Make it more specific!”

The opposite truth:
“Listen, your talk is too particular and too specific. Make it more abstract!”

A good theoretical understanding is also needed.


3.2 Theoretical approach

Development from Chomsky (1965) up to Bachman & Palmer (1996)

Problems in Bachman & Palmer (1996)
Not interactive enough
Mysterious 'strategic competence'
Obliterated 'psychophysiological mechanisms'


4 SOLUTION

4.1 Addition of mindreading ability and physical ability to linguistic ability


Mindreading ability is involved in interaction.

Strategic competence can be demystified by the introduction of the mindreading ability.

The mindreading ability is a theoretical notion supported by “Theory of Mind” and “Relevance Theory” (To be explained later)

Making Physical ability more conspicuous: Linguistic and nonlinguistic physical ability.


4.2 A three-dimensional understanding of communicative language ability




4.3 Mindreading ability

4.3.1 Theory of Mind


According to Baron-Cohen (1997), Theory of Mind is an ability to understand that others have beliefs, desires and intentions that are different from one's own, and, with that understanding, to explain and predict others' behavior.

Young children (under 3 or 4 years old) and autistic persons seem to lack Theory of Mind.

-> Theory of Mind is a basis of interpersonal communication.


4.3.2 Relevance Theory

"Given the particular nature and difficulty of the task, the general mind-reading hypothesis is implausible." "[Comprehension] might involve a sub-module of the mind-reading module, an automatic application of a relevance-based procedure to ostensive stimuli, and in particular to linguistic utterances." (Sperber and Wilson, 2002, pp.20-21)


The First, or Cognitive, Principle of Relevance:
"Human cognition is geared to the maximization of relevance."

"The relevance of an input for an individual at a given time is a positive function of the cognitive benefits that he would gain from processing it, and a negative function of the processing effort needed to achieve these benefits. (Sperber and Wilson 2002, p. 14)


In other words: The more benefit, the better: the less effort, the better. Strike a balance between the benefit and the effort for relevance.

The Second, or Communicative, Principle of Relevance
"Every utterance conveys a presumption of its own relevance."

Presumption of relevance

"The utterance is presumed to be the most relevant one compatible with the speaker's abilities and preferences, and at least relevant enough to be worth the hearer's attention." (Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995, pp. 266-78. Emphasis added).


->Unlike the "knowledge of language" (Chomsky 1986), a speaker can increase her relevance by learning to do so. A better speaker can make a speech that produces more benefit with less effort on the part of the listener.


4.3.3 Mindreading ability

->Mindreading ability in communication is to anticipate other's mind and to infer the intention of the other successfully.

Mindreading ability in linguistic communication

->Mindreading ability in speaking and writing is for the speaker/writer to anticipate the listener's/reader's mind and to arrange words as the listener/reader would understand well, not as the speaker/writer would like to arrange.

->Mindreading ability in listening and reading is for the listener/reader to anticipate the speaker's/writer's mind and to understand his utterance as he meant it to be, not as the listener/reader would like to understand.


4.4 Physical ability

4.4.1. Linguistic physical ability


'Psychophysiological mechanisms' (Bachman 1990)

4.4.2. Non-linguistic physical ability

Body language (including indexical behaviors), tone of the voice, eye-contact, facial expression, etc.


4.5 Linguistic ability

Dual meaning of 'knowledge'
(1) 'usage' or 'conventions' as in 'language knowledge' by Bachman
(2) 'competence' as in 'knowledge of language' by Chomsky

4.5.1 Usage

Grammatical, textual, sociolinguistic, and functional

4.5.2 Competence

Underlying all the usages in language use


4.6 Interrelated independence of the three abilities





4.7 Different types of English Language Teaching




4.8 Coherence with the past theories



















5 CONCLUSION

5.1 Innovating understanding


The standard assessment framework of accuracy, fluency and complexity cannot assess the mindreading ability, which is considered a basis of interpersonal communication or interaction.

Non-linguistic physical ability plays a very important role in actual communication, though it is usually dropped from the items of a paper-based standardized test.

Innovating our understanding of second language communication is crucial.

Imposition of a standardized test without a good understanding of second language communication is detrimental.


"Something that we know when on one asks us, but no longer know when we are supposed to give an account of it, is something that we need to remind ourselves of (and it is obviously something of which for some reason it is difficult to remind oneself.) " Wittgenstein (1953, Section 88)



5.2 Consistency and diversity

Consistency and diversity in curriculum should be maintained and developed through innovating our understanding of second language communication.


5.3 Remaining issues

'Emergence' in interaction
Literacy and written language.
Integrity and humanity
Why communicative language ability alone?
Accountability



REFERENCE

Bachman, L.F. (1990) Fundamental considerations in language testing. Oxford University Press.
Bachman, L.F. and A.S. Palmer (1996) Language testing in practice. Oxford University Press.
Baron-Cohen, S. (1997) Mindblindness. Bradford Books.
Chomsky, N. (1965) Aspects of the theory of syntax. The MIT Press.
Chomsky, N. (1986) Knowledge of language. Praeger
McNamara, T.F. (1996) Measuring second language performance. Longman.
McNamara, T.F. (1997) 'Interaction' in second language performance assessment: Whose performance? Applied Linguistics, Vol. 18, No. 4. pp. 446-466.
Sperber and Wilson, (1986/1995) Relevance: Communication and Cognition. Blackwell.
Sperber, D. and D. Wilson. (2002) "Pragmatics, modularity and mind-reading." In Mind & Language, Vol.17. Nos 1 and 2. pp. 3-23.
Widdowson, H.G. (1983) Learning purpose and language use. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Wittgenstein, L. (1953) Philosophical investigations. Blackwell.