Monday, June 25, 2012
I self-describe myself.
(Just as the right hand draws the left hand in Escher's picture).
Myself self-described is immediately read by 'I' who self-describes.
(Just as the left hand draws the right hand).
'I' who self-describes is now affected by myself self-described.
'I' is now a self-reference of myself, which is a self-reference of I.
Neither 'I' or myself is free from this self-referential circle.
Could I ever describe the "genuine I" that is unaffected by my self-description?
Or is there any "genuine I" that is unaffected by my self-description?
The "genuine I" wouldn't show up in my self-description.
(Just as you who see Escher's picture above doesn't show up in the picture).
My self-description never expresses the "genuine I".
I may describe anything "genuinely", but 'I' seems to be the only exception.
Could I describe anything other than myself "genuinely"?
Or indeed, could anyone describe anything other than himself "genuinely"?
I wonder again.
Any description of anything by anybody is done through his words and affected by his history; he can only use his words acquired in his own history.
Of course, as long as his words are used for communication successfully, they are not entirely arbitrary, but the fact remains that no one is free from his self-referential circle.
Someone uses words, but his words are not truely objective (or "genuine") but affected by his history, and once they are used, they affect him again and his history is renewed.
Whatever we do, we have to involve ourselves in what we do.
There's no way we can get rid of ourselves.
All of us are autopoietically closed in operation (Luhmann).
When we communicate, for example, we're all trapped in our own autopoiesis.
So, should there be anyone who observes our communication "genuinely", it cannot be any one of us.
The "genuine observer" never shows up in our communication.
It is only supposed outside our communication.
(Just like the "genuine I" is supposed only outside my self-desription).
The "genuine observer" of of any kind is only our linguistic concpetion.
It never exists physically.
If someone claims he is the one and participates in our communication, he is, by the very act of communication, affected by us and affects us. He is no longer genuinely objective.
Then, why bother with the "genuine observer"?
Blame Descartes, who posited the non-physical "I".
Blame other modernists, too, who claimed that such "I" could be the "genuine observer" of objective reality.
We're all closed in operation, and that is why communication that is not dictated by anyone is so important for us.
If someone claims that he is the genuine observer and dictates communication, the rest of us are under his total control. Communication is dead.
Continuation of communication suggests that our operational closure is not so hopeless.
And not-so-hopelessness is our hope.
Call the genuine observer of our operation "God", if you want.
That statement does not prove the existence of God, though.
Believe in God, if you want, but never say anything about it.
What follows is a draft that I wanted to integrate into an essay about 'I'. I was not able to do so, and wrote a short essay instead (please see the following post if you're interested). Yet, the draft is, hopefully, readable as a short essay that explains Damasio's theory of consciousness and self with addition of some elements of Luhmann's systems theory. Please go on to read if you're interested. I put the figure below to give you an intuitive overview of Damasio's argument.
1 Nonconscious life and its emotion
Although the human is such a complicated life system, it evolved from more basic life systems and still share many features with those systems. Understanding of the human requires understanding of basic life systems. We start from nonconsious life systems
Any life system faces 'objects'(anything that is detectable by a life system) that come from its 'environment'. The environment, being defined as what is NOT the system, contains all sorts of changes, but most of them are not detected by a life system as its 'objects' (for example, I do not detect almost all of the molecular movements in the air). However, some changes are detected even by a single-celled organism. The detection is an advantage of a life system in comparison with a non-life system (a stone, for example) because a life system detects changes (i.e., objects) that affect its life. The detection of objects increases the chance of survival in its environment.
The detection of objects is represented internally so that the life system can use the representation for starting its own movement (the movement of a stone is only dictated by the physical law, whereas a life system can react on its own). The internal representation is about motions (=changes) in the body of the life system and Damasio called it 'emotion' (to avoid confusion, I'd prefer to use a technical term such as 'e-motion', but I'll follow Damasio's terminology). The detection is represented in the nervous system of the life system, constituting its first-order neural pattern. By 'feeling' the emotion (i.e., the first-order neural pattern), the life system can initiate its own reaction (or action) for its survival.
This concept of the detection of objects, incidentally, corresponds with the definition of information by Bateson: 'a difference which makes a difference.' Finding objects (information) is important for a life system for its survival. Information detection should be selectively improved (i.e., to detect all but only information that is critical for the survival).
To increase the chance of survival further, it is advantageous for a life system to be 'aware' of the detection, and still more, to keep the record of the awareness internally for potential future use. This is why, I assume, some life systems evolved to have consciousness and memory.
2 CORE CONSCIOUSNESS AND CORE SELF
Life systems that have been evolved beyond the level of detecting information (i.e., its objects in its environment) to be aware of (or to know) the detection so that it can better be used in future are those that have consciousness, or to be more exact, 'core consciousness' in the terminology of Damasio.
Basic life systems that are only at the level of detecting information just react automatically. If the environment is stable and regular, this automatic reaction should be sufficient. However, if the environment is quite changeable, or if a life system is to explore more into its environment, a life system should not just react automatically but also be conscious of the detection and reaction. As the detection and reaction is of the first-order neural pattern, being conscious of (or knowing) the detection and reaction is of the second-order neural pattern; The first-order neural pattern makes the detection and reaction possible, and it is the second-order neural pattern that makes possible consciousness or knowledge of the first-neural pattern.
This second-order neural representation of core consciousness is the source of the sense of self, or 'core self' according to Damasio. And as core consciousness (the second-order neural representation) is based on the first-order neural representation, which is ultimately based on (the detection of) objects in the environment, we may argue that our (core) consciousness is first initiated by our environment (although, of course, it is made aware of by the functions of our internal life system). -- Is this emphasis on objects in the environment related to the argument about intentionality by Brentano and Husserl? --
The sense of core self emerges in us because of the role of core consciousness. If something is not only detected but also known (or made conscious), there should be something that serves as the subject of knowing the object. Furthermore, if some new (re)action is produced from the knowledge (or the consciousness), there should be something that serves as the agent of the (re)action. Something that serves as the subject/agent emerges in the life system. (Here I may be introducing a normative metaphysical argument into what should only be a biological discussion. But how can we discuss biology or indeed anything without metaphysics?)
The core self equipped with conscious knowledge of the detection and reaction now maintains this second-order neural representation for its better chance of survival in future. This is memory, and as this memory is built through its own experience, this memory is called by Damasio 'autobiographical memory'.
Autobiographical memory is maintained presumably even by some non-linguistic animals like dogs, because dogs remember their experience and learn to react differently from the past. However, an animal that uses signs can encode (to a varying degree) its autobiographical memory into the signs and use them for itself, and perhaps more importantly, exploits the signs made by other animals for its own advantage. Autobiographical memory, at least some part of it, is now extended beyond one animal to its community by the use of signs. The typical animal that uses signs is of course humans. In the next section, I'll explain the new type of consciousness and self ('extended consciousness' and 'autobiographical self') that humans have acquired mostly but not exclusively by the use of language. (Although there are other signs than language, I'll focus on language in the next section because it is the typical and most powerful sign).
3 EXTENDED CONSCIOUSNESS AND AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SELF
Language expands our horizons. With the use of language, we more explicitly recall the past (of ours and others'), imagine alternative realities of the current situation, and rehearse possible scenarios for the future. Our consciousness is now beyond 'here and now' of core consciousness and extended into possible realities. Damasio calls this type of consciousness 'extended consciousness'.
Below is my summary about Damasio's different types of consciousness and self. I haven't introduced the term 'proto-self' above to make the argument simpler. But its meaning should be obvious from the table below. I should also mention that there can be non-linguistic extended consciousness (for example, by the use of non-linguistic signs). However, as the use of language is almost ubiquitous in our mental life, I described extended consciousness as "linguistically conscious" in the table below.
One thing I'm emphasizing in this essay is that it is mostly through the use of language that our consciousness is fully extended and our sense of self is thoroughly autobiographical. If we only use non-linguistic signs that do not contain syntax and metaphors, our recall, imagination, and scenarios must be incomparably limited.
However, another thing we should pay attention to is that language has its roots in the body of its user. Language is ultimately based on the detection of objects in the environment as information (i.e., something that is critical for its life) and the detection and core consciousness of it are made possible by the different body states that the life system feels and knows. In short, without the body, there's no language use. I'll explain more in the next section.
[I gave up writing here.]
'Feeling' of language as a sign of autopoiesis
Damasio (2000) The Feeling of What Happens
Friday, June 22, 2012
Below are slides I often use to explain how to write an academic paper.
(1) Three most important questions you should ask about your paper.
(2) Three components of INTRODUCTION
(3) For important key terms, you need these.
(4) WHAT-HOW-WHY (detailed)
(5) The structure of your argument
(6) Argument consists of a line of small claims.
(7) Do not pretend that your argument is perfect.
(8) Get a wide audience for your narrow topic, and let them feel relevance.
(9) Four stages of writing a thesis
(10) Balance between overview and detailed description.
(11) Expand your horizons gradually.
(12) Towards the end of writhing a thesis, you need ...
(13) General/Specific and Before/After in a paper